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THE MARYLAND RULES OF EVIDENCE
THE NEW MARYLAND RULES OF EVIDENCE:
SURVEY, ANALYSIS AND CRITIQUE
ALAN D. HORNSTEIN*
I. INTRODUCTION
Title 5 of the Maryland Rules of Practice and Procedure, effective
July 1, 1994, comprises the new rules of evidence for the State's
courts.1 Prior to the adoption of the new rules, Maryland evidence
law consisted of a grab bag of statutory provisions, rules of practice
and, primarily, common-law precedent. Consequently, the new rules
mark a significant change in the organization of the law of evidence in
Maryland. Fortunately for Maryland practitioners, the substantive
content of the new rules of evidence embodies less substantial change
than the new form might suggest.
This Survey reviews and analyzes the new Maryland Rules of Evi-
dence.2 It discusses changes in Maryland's law of evidence and how
and why the new rules differ from the Federal Rules of Evidence on
which they were modeled. Occasionally, the Survey offers predictions
* Copyright © 1995 by Alan D. Hornstein
Professor of Law, University of Maryland School of Law; Special Co-Reporter and Spe-
cial Consultant, Evidence Subcommittee, Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure
of the Court of Appeals of Maryland. I am grateful to Christopher van de Verg, University
of Maryland School of Law Class of 1996, for able research assistance and to the members
of the Evidence Rules Subcommittee, especially Alan Wilner, ChiefJudge of the Court of
Special Appeals of Maryland and Chair of the Subcommittee, and Professor Lynn McLain
of the University of Baltimore School of Law and Reporter for the Evidence Rules project,
for thoughtful and provocative discussions that have enriched my understanding of the law
of evidence.
1. See 333 Md. XXXV-XXXVI (1993). The prior law continued to govern in trials that
had begun prior to July 1. Perhaps in an excess of caution, the Court of Appeals order
adopting Title 5 declared that in trials for criminal offenses allegedly committed prior to
the effective date of the new rules, evidence is admissible against an accused only if it
would have been admissible under the pre-rules law. Id. at XXXVI; see also Graves v. State,
334 Md. 30, 36-37 n.2, 637 A.2d 1197, 1201 n.2 (1994). Curiously, the order did not ad-
dress the question of evidence that might have been admissible in favor of the accused
under the pre-rules regime, but inadmissible under Title 5.
2. For a comprehensive study of Title 5 of the Maryland Rules of Practice and Proce-
dure, see LYNN MCLAIN, MARYLAND RuLEs OF EVIDENCE (1994).
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about how courts may interpret the new rules. Finally, the Survey crit-
ically analyzes particular rules and suggests some alternative
formulations.
A. A Bit of History
A brief history of the development of the new rules may aid in
understanding their substance and structure. After the adoption of
the Federal Rules of Evidence in 1975, a number of states enacted
substantially similar rules for their own courts. In early 1977, Mary-
land considered the wisdom and feasibility of such a project. Under
the chairmanship of Judge Rodowsky, a subcommittee of the Commit-
tee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Court of Appeals pre-
pared a report modeled on the newly enacted Federal Rules. The
Court of Appeals determined that the project was, at best, premature
in view of the insufficient experience with the Federal Rules. The pro-
ject was abandoned.
By late 1988, however, the Federal Rules had operated for thir-
teen years, and thirty-five states, the military, Guam, and Puerto Rico
had adopted rules based on the federal model. Thus, there was wide
and deep experience with the operation of the rules. On the initiative
of Judge Wilner, the Rules Committee inquired of the Court of Ap-
peals whether it wished to reconsider the question of a set of evidence
rules for Maryland. The court responded affirmatively and estab-
lished an Evidence Rules Subcommittee. The Subcommittee was to
review Maryland's law of evidence, the experience of the federal
courts under the Federal Rules of Evidence, as well as the experience
of the states that had adopted similar rules, and then make a recom-
mendation for Maryland. The court did not wish the Subcommittee
simply to propose an uncritical adoption of the Federal Rules.
The Subcommittee completed a draft in 1992, after which the
project was considered by the full Rules Committee. For the next
year, the Committee worked to consider and revise the Subcommit-
tee's draft. In July 1993, the Committee issued its 125th Report, a
proposed Title 5 of the Maryland Rules of Practice and Procedure-
the Evidence Rules.3 Following a comment period, the Court of Ap-
peals held a public hearing on the proposal, after which the court
voted six to one to adopt a code of evidence. Thereafter, the court
held another public hearing at which the specific rules and proposed
amendments were presented and considered. On December 15,
3. 20 Md. Reg. pt. II, at 1 (July 23, 1993) (issue no. 15).
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1993, the Court of Appeals formally adopted Title 5 of the Maryland
Rules.4
Judge Eldridge dissented, preferring the current, largely com-
mon-law evidence regime and perhaps out of doubt that the court had
the authority to adopt the new rules.5 Judge Chasanow, joined by
Judge Bell, supported the idea of Title 5, but advanced specific criti-
cisms of particular rules.6 Judges Chasanow and Bell would have pre-
ferred a set of rules that followed the federal model more closely.
B. Advantages of Codification on the Federal Model
Prior to the adoption of Title 5 of the Maryland Rules, Maryland's
evidence law was spread throughout the Maryland Reports and the
Maryland Code. Researching a particular evidentiary issue was diffi-
cult and inefficient, particularly at the trial level where time is fre-
quently short and objections or arguments often must be advanced
without the opportunity for comprehensive research. Reducing at
least the outlines of Maryland evidence law to a single volume of sixty-
one rules immediately makes the law more accessible. As a result, trial
level decisions will be better informed, which may reduce the portion
of the appellate docket devoted to evidentiary matters.
The Federal Rules of Evidence, moreover, have had a substantial
unifying effect on evidence law. Most American law schools teach evi-
dence largely through the Federal Rules, supplemented by local law;
law school graduates of the last dozen years have learned the law of
evidence as reflected in the Federal Rules. Consequently, practition-
ers in those states whose law of evidence is modeled on the Federal
Rules have an educational grounding that may produce more enlight-
ened practice.
Because so many jurisdictions have adopted evidence rules
modeled on the Federal Rules, the body of law available on eviden-
tiary questions that share the federal format has expanded substan-
tially the base of wisdom and experience in evidentiary matters.
Similarly, there are several treatises7 and services8 as well as hundreds
of law review articles devoted to the Federal Rules. Judges Chasanow
4. 333 Md. XXXV (1993).
5. Id. at XXXVII-XXXVIII (Eldridge, J., dissenting).
6. Id at XXXIX-XLVI (Chasanow, J., dissenting in part).
7. See CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, FEDERAL EVIDENCE (1994);
EDWARD CLEARY ET AL., McCoRMICK ON EVIDENCE (1994); STEPHEN SALTZBERG ET AL., FED-
ERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE MANUAL (1994); C.W. WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PRO-
CEDURE (1994).
8. See, e.g., JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE (1994).
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and Bell may have had this body of experience in mind when they
objected to Maryland's departure from the language of the Federal
Rules in a number of instances.9 Although no jurisdiction is bound by
the decisions of others and each jurisdiction may have departed from
the precise language of the Federal Rules, the value of such a large
body of persuasive authority is impressive.
It is important, however, not to conclude that similar, or even
identical, language will receive the same interpretation in one jurisdic-
tion as it has in another. There are a number of examples of lan-
guage in Title 5 of the Maryland Rules that are not intended to mirror
the meaning of the same language in the Federal Rules of Evidence."
Many differences between the Maryland rules and their federal
counterparts are a result of the absence of federalism concerns that
occasionally animate the Federal Rules but are not relevant to a state
jurisdiction. Some differences are merely stylistic, done for purposes
of clarification; some differences are more profound and reflect im-
portant policy differences. Yet, the similarities far outweigh the differ-
ences and are likely to nurture a more carefully considered, better
developed body of evidence law in Maryland.
II. THE STRUCTURE OF TITLE 5
One of the most important similarities among the jurisdictions
that model their rules on the federal format is the uniformity of struc-
ture and vocabulary. This uniformity allows research in the law of evi-
dence to proceed much more efficiently and effectively. The drafters
of Maryland's evidence rules were quite conscious of these advantages
and attempted to follow the basic structure of the Federal Rules as
much as possible. With only a few exceptions," the numbering sys-
tem of the Maryland Rules mimics the Federal Rules, with the added
prefix of "5-", indicating that the rules are contained in Title 5 of the
Maryland Rules of Practice and Procedure.
Chapter 100 of the Maryland Rules comprises general provisions
that might be thought of as housekeeping rules. They inform the
bench and bar when to apply the rules, how to apply them, and what
consequences follow from the failure to apply them correctly. Struc-
turally, Rule 5-101 combines the material contained in Federal Rule
9. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
10. See, e.g., supra notes 69-73 and accompanying text (standard for prior bad act evi-
dence); supra notes 153-159 and accompanying text (test for admissibility of novel scien-
tific evidence).
11. CompareMD. R. 5-101 with FED. R. EVID. 101 and Article XI; MD. R. 5-802.1 With FED.
R. EVID. 801(d)(1); MD. R. 5-803(a) with FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2). See also MD. R. 5-616.
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101 and Article XI of the Federal Rules, providing the scope of the
rules and indicating the courts and proceedings to which they are ap-
plicable, rather than dividing these issues into separate articles or
chapters at opposite ends of the rules.
Chapters 200 and 300, which deal with Judicial Notice and Pre-
sumptions, respectively, are structurally substantially the same as their
federal counterparts. Rule 5-301 (b), however, deals with inconsistent
presumptions, a topic on which the Federal Rules are silent. Federal
Rule 302 is devoted to the problem of vertical choice of law: so-called
Erie issues. The analogous Maryland Rule speaks to horizontal choice
of law: the question of which state's law governs the effect of a foreign
presumption applied under the law of conflict of laws.
Chapter 400 mirrors the structure of Article IV of the Federal
Rules. It comprises the relevancy principle and some of the tradi-
tional standardized applications of that principle with an overlay of
social policy. Rules 5-401, 5-402, and 5-403 are the holy trinity of the
Rules, the animating spirit of the entire body of rules. Rule 5-401 de-
fines "relevant evidence" as "evidence having any tendency to make the
existence of any fact that is of consequence to the [litigation] more
... or less probable than it would be without the evidence."12 This
broad definition of relevance collapses the common-law notion of ma-
teriality into the Rule through the "of consequence" language. Under
a common-law analysis, evidence that under the Rule would not be "of
consequence" would not be material.
Rule 5-402 is a rule of inclusion and exclusion. It declares a very
broad principle of admissibility and states the bedrock principle of
exclusion of any rational law of evidence: 3 "Evidence that is not rele-
vant is not admissible." 4 The branch of the Rule concerned with the
inclusion of evidence is the only such rule in the entire body of the
Rules. 5 It declares that all relevant evidence is admissible unless ex-
cluded by some particular provision of law. Except for Rule 5402, the
entire corpus of evidence law can be viewed as a series of particular
exclusionary rules.
Rule 5-403, the final rule in the central trilogy of Title 5, is the
most important of the exclusionary rules. It establishes the basic
12. MD. R. 5-401 (emphasis added).
13. See, e.g., JAr.Ms B. THAYER, A PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE AT THE COMMON
LAW 264-65 (1898) ("There is . .. a presupposition involved in the very conception of a
rational system of evidence... which forbids receiving anything irrelevant, not logically
probative.").
14. MD. R. 5-402.
15. With the possible exception of Rule 5-609; see infra notes 122-123 and accompany-
ing text.
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formula for the admission and exclusion of evidence, a formula em-
bodied in other rules' applications to particular situations. The Rule
holds that otherwise admissible evidence may be excluded "if its pro-
bative value is substantially outweighed" by a number of negative fac-
tors: the dangers of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues,
misleading the jury, undue delay, etc. 6 It is important to note that a
rough balance between an item of evidence's probative value and
these counterfactors will result in admissibility; probative value must
be substantially outweighed by negative factors for the evidence to be
inadmissible under Rule 5-403. Evidence that satisfies the require-
ments of all the other rules may nonetheless be excluded if it fails the
balancing test required by Rule 5-403.17
The remainder of Chapter 4 comprises a series of rules that com-
bine the underlying principle of Rule 5-403 with a number of policy
overlays. The structure of Chapter 4 is essentially identical to Article
IV of the Federal Rules of Evidence.
Article V of the Federal Rules of Evidence originally was drafted
as a laundry list of privileges. Political opposition that threatened the
passage of the Federal Rules led to the abandonment of the effort,18
and Article V as enacted contains a single rule, declaring that a claim
of privilege is to be determined in accordance with "the principles of
the common law ... in the light of reason and experience."1 9 The
drafters of the Maryland Rules proposed no rules pertaining to evi-
dentiary privileges. In order to maintain a numbering system congru-
ent with the federal model, the Maryland Rules contain no Chapter
500.
With one important exception, Chapter 600 of the Maryland
Rules has essentially the same structure as Article VI of the Federal
Rules. The exception, Maryland Rule 5-616, is an omnibus impeach-
ment rule for which there is no federal counterpart. It sets out the
various methods of impeachment and rehabilitation of witnesses,
whether or not covered by other rules. Although the Committee Note
indicates that the rule is not intended to be exhaustive or to foreclose
other methods of impeachment, it would be difficult to devise a
method of impeachment not covered by Rule 5-616. Some of the pro-
visions of Rule 5-616 refer to other rules, for example, Rules 5-608, 5-
609, and 5-613, while other provisions are purely self-referential.
16. MD. P, 5-403.
17. See Graves v. State, 334 Md. 30, 40, 637 A.2d 1197, 1202-03 (1994).
18. See FED. R. EVID. 501 advisory committee's note.
19. FED. R. EVID. 501.
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The subject matter of these other provisions-bias, contradiction,
etc.-are treated only implicitly in the Federal Rules.2' Thus, the Fed-
eral Rules' impeachment article largely concerns limitations on the
use of relevant impeaching evidence. The explicit impeachment rules
in the Federal Rules of Evidence elaborate categories of inadmissible
impeachment evidence,2 1 address special requirements not fairly in-
ferred from the relevancy rules,2 2 or change long-standing common-
law requirements. 23
The structure of Chapter 700 of Title 5 is in most respects identi-
cal to Article VII of the Federal Rules.24 Unlike its Federal Rule ana-
log, Rule 5-703 is divided into three paragraphs to make explicit what
is only implicit in the Federal Rule. It is. a more detailed statement of
the treatment of the bases for expert opinions that may not be inde-
pendently admissible in evidence.
Chapter 800, which addresses hearsay, provides the greatest de-
parture from the structure of the Federal Rules. Both Article VIII of
the Federal Rules and Chapter 800 of Title 5 of the Maryland Rules
begin with an identical definition section. Rule 801 (c) defines hear-
say as, essentially, an out-of-court statement offered to prove the truth
of the matter asserted. Paragraph (d) of Federal Rule 801 declares a
number of such statements, such as various categories of party admis-
sions and out-of-court statements made by testifying witnesses, "not
hearsay." Maryland Rule 5-801, by contrast, contains no such para-
graph (d). The Maryland Rules continue to treat statements meeting
the definition of hearsay as hearsay.25 Both Federal Rule 802 and
Maryland Rule 5-802 declare hearsay inadmissible except as otherwise
provided.
The classification of hearsay exceptions under the Maryland
Rules is tripartite: Rule 5-802.1 does the work of Federal Rule
801 (d) (1), providing a hearsay exception for certain out-of-court
statements by persons who are testifying witnesses; Rule 5-803 deals
with hearsay statements without regard to whether the declarant will
testify or is available to testify; Rule 5-804 deals with statements by de-
clarants who are unavailable to testify.
20. See infra note 97.
21. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 610 (religious beliefs).
22. See, e.g., FED. R. EvID. 609 (prior conviction used to impeach must be within ten
years).
23. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 613 (abolishing the rule of Queen Caroline's Case in impeach-
ment by prior inconsistent statement). See infra notes 101-106 and accompanying text.
24. But identical language does not necessarily mean identical interpretations. See in-
fra notes 148-157 and accompanying text.
25. See MD. K 5-802.1 and MD. R. 5-803(a).
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Party admissions, not treated as hearsay under the Federal Rules,
fall within the Tide 5 definition of hearsay, but are treated as an ex-
ception to the rule against hearsay by Maryland Rule 5-803(a).
Although there are some substantive differences, Maryland Rule 5-
803(b) (1-24) is the analog to Federal Rule 803(1-24) with two excep-
tions. The hearsay exception for past recollection recorded found in
Federal Rule 803(5) is addressed by Maryland Rule 5-802.1 (e), as one
of several categories of statements by testifying witnesses; records of
prior convictions, treated by Federal Rule 803(22), is addressed by
26Maryland statute. In both cases the original paragraph numbers are
retained to comport with the numbering system of the Federal Rules.
Maryland Rule 5-804, which lists exceptions to the rule against hearsay
requiring the unavailability of the declarant, and Rule 5-805, treating
multiple levels of hearsay, are virtually identical to their federal coun-
terparts. Finally, Rule 5-806, governing impeachment and support of
hearsay declarants, differs from its federal counterpart only to the ex-
tent necessary to accommodate the other structural changes to the
hearsay rules.
Article IX of the Federal Rules of Evidence and Chapter 900 of
Title 5 of the Maryland Rules are devoted to "Authentication and
Identification." These rules declare the foundation necessary for the
admission of certain categories of evidence. In most respects the two
bodies of law are substantially the same, although the Maryland Rules
are a bit more generous than their federal counterpart with respect to
the authentication of business records.27 Finally, Article X of the Fed-
eral Rules of Evidence and Chapter 1000 of Title 5 of the Maryland
Rules are essentially identical in structure and content.
In addition to the rules themselves, Title 5 includes several cate-
gories of notes to the rules. Committee Notes, from the Committee
on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Court of Appeals, are not in
themselves law, but provide important guidance to the interpretation
of the rules. Indeed, a number of these notes were included at the
express wish of the court. These notes should be distinguished from
the Reporter's Notes that are found in the legislative history of Title
5.28 The Reporter's Notes, though helpful to an understanding of the
Rules, are less authoritative than the Committee Notes.
A second important category of notes to the rules are cross refer-
ences to other rules or statutory provisions. Many of these references
26. MD. CODE ANN., CTS. &JuD. PROC. § 10-904 (1989).
27. See infra note 259 and accompanying text.
28. Available in the files of the Rules Committee.
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are attached to rules that declare: "Except as otherwise provided. ... "
In such instances the cross-reference will point to some provision of
law "otherwise providing." For example, Rule 5-601 provides,
"[e]xcept as otherwise provided by law, every person is competent to
be a wimess." Attached to the Rule are cross references to Sections 9-
104 and 9-116 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article of the
Maryland Code. The former declares convicted perjurers incompe-
tent to testify while the latter is a reference to the Dead Man's Statute,
which survives the codification of the law of evidence.
The final category of notes is the source note, which indicates the
origin of the rule to which it is attached. Most often the source note
will direct the researcher to the analogous Federal Rule, but on occa-
sion the source of a particular rule may be the Uniform Rules of Evi-
dence 2 9 or a rule from another jurisdiction. 0 Although similar
language does not necessarily carry the same meaning, it may be help-
ful to interpreting a particular rule to determine how it has been con-
strued by the jurisdiction from which it was derived.
One further structural matter must be noted: the relationship of
the newly codified rules of evidence to pre-existing statutory and com-
mon law. One will search Title 5 in vain for guidance on this issue,
other than a cross-reference from Rule 5-102, "Purpose and Construc-
tion," to Rule 1-201. The cross-referenced provision of Title 1 makes
it clear that the law of evidence pre-existing enactment of Title 5 con-
tinues to operate "unless inconsistent with these rules."3 ' Thus, prac-
titioners need not fear that they must discard all their knowledge of
Maryland's evidence law in light of the new rules. Only so much of
prior law as is inconsistent with the rules is superseded. For example,
Rule 5-402 establishes relevance as a condition of admissibility. Prior
case law finding a particular kind of evidence relevant to a particular
proposition remains applicable under Rule 5-402's relevancy require-
ment. Similarly, what constitutes a "habit" under Rule 5-406 may be
informed by cases pre-existing the adoption of Title 5.
III. CHAPTER 100-GENERAL PROVISIONS
The provisions of Chapter 100 combine the subject matter of Ar-
ticles I and XI of the Federal Rules of Evidence. Rule 5-101 declares
the proceedings to which the rules apply. In essence, Title 5 applies
29. See, e.g., MD. R. 5-301.
30. See, e.g., MD. R 5-703(b) & (c) (citing Ky. R. EVwD. 703(b) & (c)); MD. R. 5-802.1(a)
(citing HAwAn R. EVID. 802.1(1)).
31. MD. R. 1-201(c) (1994).
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to all plenary contested proceedings in the Maryland courts. Rule 5-
101 (b) lists a number of proceedings to which the Rules are inapplica-
ble, and Rule 5-101(c) allows the court to "decline to require strict
application" of the rules in a number of other situations, but the rules
on competency of witnesses apply even though other rules may be
relaxed.
The Rules also apply to the determination of preliminary ques-
tions of fact on which the admissibility of evidence depends, unless, in
the interest ofjustice, the court declines to require their strict applica-
tion. Trial judges who decline strict application should note their rea-
sons on the record in order to assure adequate appellate review.
Maryland Rule 5-104(a) is stricter than its federal analog: Federal
Rule 104(a) declares the Rules of Evidence inapplicable to prelimi-
nary questions of fact on which the admissibility of evidence may de-
pend.32 In effect, Rule 5-101 (c) permits a court to relax the rules that
pertain to authentication and the admissibility of hearsay evidence.
Although Rule 5-101 (c) is silent on the matter, the court may not
refuse to apply the law of privilege. The Rule's silence is premised on
the notion that the Maryland Rules themselves contain no provision
with respect to privilege, while they do address issues of competency.
Thus, an explicit provision about a court's inability to relax compe-
tency rules, but not privileges, was a necessity. Should a court decline
to follow the law of privilege with respect to any of the matters listed
in paragraph (c), the confidentiality effected by the privilege is de-
stroyed, as it would be in a plenary proceeding. To avoid misappre-
hension, it would have been better to declare privilege law exempt
from the court's discretion to relax the rules, especially since the lan-
guage of Rule 5-104(a) otherwise tracks Rule 5-101 (c). Federal Rule
104(a), moreover, explicitly excepts privilege from the inapplicability
of the Rules of Evidence to preliminary questions of admissibility.33
Rule 5-102 substantively mirrors its federal analog. There is some
controversy within the scholarly community about the extent to which
the Federal Rules of Evidence are the exclusive source of evidence law
in the federal courts or whether there is any role remaining for the
common law of evidence.3 ' Rule 5-102's cross-reference to Maryland
32. See Bouraily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171 (1987).
33. Federal Rule 104(a) requires the court to apply the rules of privilege. FED. R. EVID.
104(a). The Federal Rules, however, unlike Title 5, do contain a privilege article, even if
not particularly substantive.
34. Compare Edward W. Cleary, Preliminary Notes on Reading the Rules of Evidence, 57 NEB.
L. REv. 908, 915 (1978) ("In principle, under the Federal rules no common law of evi-
dence remains.") and EdwardJ. Imwinkelreid, The Meaning of Probative Value and Prejudice in
Federal Rule of Evidence 403: Can Rule 403 Be Used to Resurrect the Common Law of Evidence?, 41
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Rule 1-201 makes it clear that the common law of evidence continues
to play a role in Maryland, despite the enactment of Title 5. Unless
inconsistent with the newly enacted rules, Maryland's common and
statutory law of evidence is not intended to be superseded. Of course,
the existence vel non of such inconsistencies in particular cases must
be settled in future litigation.
Rule 5-103 establishes the conditions under which an evidentiary
ruling may be contested on appeal. It is consistent with current Mary-
land practice. In general, the Rule concerns appellate courts more
than trial courts and provides the requirements for appellate review of
evidentiary rulings. Although the Rule is silent on the matter, the
Committee Note to Rule 5-103(a) (2) makes it clear that the standard
for harmless error in criminal cases is unaffected. Similarly, the doc-
trine of plain error remains governed by Rule 8-131 (a). 5
Rule 5-103 preserves Maryland's general objection rule as a pre-
requisite to appellate review of the admission of evidence, unless the
trial court specifically requests the ground of the objection or a spe-
cific objection is required by rule.3 6 The corresponding federal rule
and the rules of most states require a specific objection to preserve a
point for appeal. y
It may have been justifiable to permit the general objection when
Maryland's law of evidence was spread out over the volumes of the
Maryland Reports, Maryland Appellate Reports, and the Maryland
Code. But with the fundamental principles of the law of evidence re-
duced to a relatively few rules, it would hardly burden trial lawyers and
judges to require that they articulate the bases for their objections and
rulings. Nor is it merely a matter of technical requirements, for if the
grounds of objection are routinely articulated, trial and appellate
judges would be able to render more informed rulings. While per-
haps not of great theoretical import, it may be that no single reform
would do more to improve the quality of trial practice than the institu-
tion of the specific objection rule. As the bench and bar become in-
VAND. L. REv. 879, 882 (1988) ("[R]ule 402 deprives the judiciary of the common-law
power to prescribe exclusionary rules of evidence") with WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 8,
1 102[01], at 102-13 ("the policy of Rule 102 authoriz[es] case-law modification of the
rules of evidence").
35. See Batson v. Shiflett, 325 Md. 684, 700-01, 602 A.2d 1191, 1199 (1992).
36. See Hof v. State, No. 93-117, 1995 WL 97324 (Md. Mar. 10, 1995). Cf MD. R. 2-
520(e) and MD. R. 4-325(e); see also Bowman v. State, 337 Md. 65, 650 A.2d 954 (1994)
(holding appellate review of jury instructions not permitted unless appellant's objection
provided trial court with opportunity to correct deficiency). See generally Dinah S.
Leventhal, Note, General Evidentiay Objections Still Valid in Maryland, 54 MD. L. REv. 1114
(1995).
37. FED. R. EVD. 103(a)(1).
1042 [VOL. 54:1032
MARYLAND RuLEs OF EVIDENCE
creasingly familiar with the new rules comprised by Title 5, specific
grounds for objections may be increasingly demanded. The applica-
tion of a de facto specific objection rule in Maryland's courts within
the next few years would not come as a surprise.
Interestingly, while a general objection suffices to preserve the
point for appeal when the objection is directed at excluding evidence,
it is necessary to make a specific offer of proof on the record where
counsel's effort is the admission of evidence over objection."8 The
Committee Note makes clear that Prout v. State, 9 holding no offer of
proof is required if the court has excluded evidence in limine through
a ruling "clearly intended to be the final word on the matter,"40 re-
mains unaffected by the rule.41
Rule 5-104 makes no substantive change in Maryland law and,
with one exception, is substantially the same as the corresponding fed-
eral rule. The Rule distinguishes two kinds of conditional admissibil-
ity. Paragraph (a) declares that the court is to determine factual
questions on which the admissibility of evidence depends. The Rule is
silent on the standard of proof to be applied to such questions. The
Federal Rules require a preponderance of evidence,4" but there is rea-
son to believe that the question under Title 5 is not so simple.4" Para-
graph (b) of Rule 5-104 declares that where it is the relevance of
evidence that is conditioned on some question of fact, the disputed
evidence is admissible if there is evidence sufficient to support a find-
ing that the conditioning fact exists."
The rules governing authentication provide an example of condi-
tional relevance:4 If one party seeks to introduce a letter purportedly
written by a particular person, the relevance of the letter may depend
upon its authorship. If it were treated simply as a problem of admissi-
bility conditioned on fact, the court would have to determine whether
the letter had been written by the person claimed to have written it.
On the other hand, as a question of conditional relevancy, the court
need only determine whether a reasonable fact finder could make
38. MD. R. 5-103(a) (2).
39. 311 Md. 348, 535 A.2d. 445 (1988).
40. Id. at 357, 535 A.2d at 449.
41. MD. R. 5-103(c).
42. Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 175-76 (1988).
43. See infra text accompanying notes 70-74.
44. See generally Ronald J. Allen, The Myth of Conditional Relevancy, 25 Loy. LA L. REv.
871 (1992); Vaughn C. Ball, The Myth of Conditional Relevancy, 14 GA. L. REv. 435 (1980);
Richard Friedman, Conditional Probative Value: Neocladsicim Without Myth, 93 MICH L. REv.
439 (1994); Dale A. Nance, Conditional Relevance Reinterpeted, 70 B.U. L. REV. 447 (1990).
45. See infra Part X. Rule 5-901 employs the standard of 5-104(b).
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such a finding. If the fact finder determines the authorship is not as
claimed, the evidence is given no weight, and no prejudice will ensue
Where admissibility on grounds other than relevancy is condi-
tioned on fact, the evidence is likely to be prejudicial whether or not
the conditioning fact is found to exist. Thus, the judge rather than
the jury must make the determination. It is precisely this sort of evi-
dence that the jury ought not hear if the conditioning fact does not
exist. For example, where the fruits of an allegedly illegal search are
proffered, the facts underlying the determination of probable cause
are for the court to determine, and the jury is not to see the evidence
unless the court finds that the facts establish probable cause. If the
jury were given the evidence with an instruction not to consider it
unless they found facts sufficient to establish probable cause, it is
likely that the jury would consider the disputed evidence regardless of
their finding on the conditioning facts.
Whether a confession is that of the defendant in a criminal case is
a question of conditional relevancy. If the confession is not the de-
fendant's, it is not relevant, and the jury will not use it against her.
But whether a confession, concededly the defendant's, violated Mi-
randa' is a question of admissibility conditioned on fact. The confes-
sion is relevant to the defendant's guilt, though it may be
inadmissible, and the jury well might consider it precisely because it is
relevant; hence, the question of its admissibility is for the court.
Perhaps the most important difference between Rule 5-104 and
its federal analog lies in how preliminary questions of fact are deter-
mined. Under the Federal Rules, the court is not bound by the rules
of evidence in making such determinations. For example, if the pros-
ecution seeks to introduce the out-of-court statement of an alleged co-
conspirator, it must first establish the existence of the conspiracy, the
participation of the declarant and the defendant, and that the state-
ment was in the course of and in furtherance of the conspiracy. These
are the preliminary facts which condition the admissibility of the state-
ment.47 Because the court is not bound by the rules of evidence in
this determination, however, the disputed statement itself, though
plainly hearsay for this purpose, may be used to establish the condi-
tioning facts. 48 To avoid this bootstrapping, Maryland Rule 5-104(a)
envisions that the rules of evidence apply to such determinations,
46. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
47. See FED. R. EVID. 801 (d) (2) (E); Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 175 (1987).
48. Bouijaily, 483 U.S. at 175.
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although it permits the court to decline to require their strict applica-
tion in the interest of justice.49
Although not apparent on the face of either the Federal Rule or
Maryland Rule 5-104(a), the standard of proof that must be satisfied
to demonstrate the existence of a fact on which the admissibility of
evidence depends is a preponderance of evidence.5" Despite the
Rule's silence, it is likely that Maryland will continue the pre-rules
higher standard for certain types of conditioning fact. For example,
State v. Faulkne¢1 requires that other misconduct evidence offered
pursuant to Rule 5404(b) be established by clear and convincing evi-
dence.52 The higher standard is likely to survive adoption of Tide 5.
Unlike its federal counterpart, Rule 5-104(c) provides no special
treatment for confessions in criminal cases, but Maryland Rule 4-252
has substantially the same effect as Federal Rule of Evidence 104(c).
The admissibility of confessions in criminal cases will be determined
out of the presence of the jury. In general, Maryland Rule 5-104(c) is
more flexible than the analogous federal rule and makes no change
in prior Maryland practice.
As the Committee Note suggests, Rule 5-104(d) should be read
together with Rule 5-611(b) (2). A criminal defendant may contest
the admissibility of evidence preliminarily, and if she also testifies as to
the facts on which admissibility is conditioned, cross-examination is
limited to those matters-and, of course, to matters of credibility.
Maryland permits, however, the accused to challenge the voluntari-
ness of a confession at trial as well as preliminarily.5" If the accused
elects to testify at trial on the question of voluntariness, such testi-
mony is no longer "a preliminary matter of admissibility," and is sub-
ject to wide open cross-examination on any relevant matter in the
case.
Rule 5-105 restates the unremarkable principle, applicable under
Maryland's common law, the Federal Rules, and virtually every other
American system of evidence, that evidence admissible for one pur-
49. See supra text accompanying note 32.
50. See Boujaily, 483 U.S. at 175; State v. Jones, 311 Md. 23, 532 A.2d 169 (1987) (al-
lowing inferences as the basis of admissibility under the present sense exception to
hearsay).
51. 314 Md. 630, 634, 552 A.2d 896, 898 (1989).
52. See infra text accompanying notes 70-74.
53. Brittingham v. State, 306 Md. 654, 666, 511 A.2d 45, 51-52 (1986) (finding once
trial judge decided to admit confession, the defense is entitled to present evidence of vol-
untariness); Hillard v. State, 286 Md. 145, 151, 406 A.2d 415, 418-19 (1979) (holding vol-




pose but inadmissible for another may be admitted for its permissible
purpose with appropriate instructions to the jury if requested. The
Committee Note makes clear that such instructions ordinarily should
be given both at the time the evidence is admitted and as part of the
jury's final instructions. It is unclear whether the court may, or even
must, instruct the jury in the absence of a request.5 4 Often the ques-
tion of whether to request an instruction will turn on tactical consider-
ations best left to the judgment of trial counsel. Counsel may elect
not to call the matter to the jury's attention, which an instruction
from the court might do.
Of course, there may be instances in which an impermissible use
of evidence, properly admitted for a limited purpose, is so inflam-
matory that an instruction can not cure its prejudicial effect. In such
cases the evidence should be excluded under Rule 5-403. For exam-
ple, in State v. Wemner 5 the defendant was charged with sexual assault,
and the state sought to introduce evidence that previously the defend-
ant had sexually assaulted the victim's sister. The state argued that the
evidence tended to prove the defendant's state of mind. Even if this
were true, the jury would be so likely to use the evidence improperly,
despite a limiting instruction, that it was error to admit the evidence.56
Rule 5-106 extends the rule of contemporaneous completeness,
applicable to depositions,57 to any writing or recorded statement.
When a party introduces a writing or recorded statement, an adverse
party may require another part of it or another writing or recorded
statement to be introduced immediately if fairness requires their con-
temporaneous consideration. The Rule is designed to prevent the
creation of a false impression through the use of a writing or record-
ing and the maintenance of it until an adverse party has the opportu-
nity for cross-examination. The Rule is strictly one of timing. It adds
little to the inherent power of the court under Rule 5-61158 to control
the mode and order of proof, as the cross-reference to that Rule sug-
gests. Indeed, to make writings and recordings subject to a specific
rule on timing might suggest that the court lacks the authority to re-
54. See United States v. Billue, 994 F.2d 1562 (1 1th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 939
(1994).
55. 302 Md. 550, 489 A.2d 1119 (1985).
56. Id. at 556, 489 A.2d at 1123.
57. See MD. R. 2-419; MD. R. 4-261.
58. See infra notes 144-147 and accompanying text.
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quire immediate introduction of similar statements not written or re-
corded, though such a suggestion would be ill-advised. 9
It is important to note that the common-law rule of completeness
survives the adoption of Rule 5-106. Under the common law, when
one party has introduced evidence of a statement or conversation or
other verbal event, an adverse party is entitled to introduce other
parts thereof or related material that is necessary to ensure that the
initial evidence is not misleading. The difference between the com-
mon law and Rule 5-106 is that under the common law the party that
introduces the contextualizing or explanatory material must await
cross-examination or the case-in-chief. While the common-law rule
continues to apply to oral statements, Rule 5-106 applies to written or
recorded statements as defined in Rule 5-1001 (a).' The reason for
the distinction is the practical one of trial administration.61
As a matter of trial practice, it would be foolhardy for a party to
introduce an incomplete portion of a statement that would create a
false impression later revealed by the adverse party. The rule of com-
pleteness, whether contemporaneous or not, is designed to keep the
parties honest. An example may help: The witness, the victim of the
attempted murder for which the defendant is being tried, is cross-ex-
amined with respect to his grand jury testimony:
Q: Did you say to the Grand Jury, and I quote, "I didn't
see who shot me"?
A: Yes.
On redirect, the prosecutor asks the witness to read the tran-
script of his Grand Jury testimony immediately preceding
and following that question and answer:
Q: Where were you when you were shot?
A: Walking by the railroad tracks.
Q: Who was with you?
A: The defendant.
Q: Were you walking side by side?
A: No, we were in a straight line because of the tracks.
Q: Where was the defendant?
A: He was behind me.
Q: Where were you shot?
A: In the back.
59. See Bloodsworth v. State, 307 Md. 164, 187, 512 A.2d 1056, 1067 (1986) (holding
defense witnesses permitted to testify about circumstantial evidence that occurred simulta-
neously with elements of the state's case).
60. See infra note 269 and accompanying text.
61. See FED. R. EVD. 106 advisory committee's note.
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Q: Did you see who shot you?
A: No, I didn't see who shot me.
Q: What, if anything, did you see as you fell?
A: I turned around as I fell, and I saw the defendant
holding a gun.
62
IV. CHAvER 200-JuDIcIAL NOTICE
Rule 5-201 is the only rule dealing with judicial notice. It is con-
sistent with both the Federal Rule as it has been interpreted and gen-
erally with prior Maryland practice. The Rule makes it plain that,
except with respect to facts adverse to criminal defendants, judicially
noticed facts are conclusive, and evidence that contradicts a judicially
noticed fact will not be received. When a fact is to be judicially no-
ticed by the trial court, the adverse party must be given an opportunity
to respond. Failure to take this opportunity is likely to bar appellate
review of the propriety of taking notice.63
V. CHAPTER 300-PREsUMPTIONS
Rule 5-301 was among the most controversial and contentious
considered by the Subcommittee. Among the views advanced were
that Title 5 should contain no rule on presumptions on the theory
that "presumptions" included so many different and inconsistent no-
tions that no uniform treatment was desirable.' Presumptions are
based on different mixes of policy, probability, access to evidence, the
need for stability, and the need for tie-breaking rules.65 The effect
given a particular presumption should reflect the varying weight of
the several factors on which that presumption is based. To the extent
presumptions are rooted in particular substantive policy choices, they
are not matters appropriate to an evidence code.
62. I am indebted to Hon.Joseph Murphy, Court of Special Appeals, for this variation
on Worthington v. State, 38 Md. App. 487, 381 A.2d 712 (1978).
63. See Smith v. Hearst Corp., 48 Md. App. 135, 140-41, 426 A.2d 1, 4 (1981).
64. The Committee Note states that the Rule as adopted deals only with "true" pre-
sumptions. Permissible inferences on the one hand and "conclusive presumptions" on the
other are not within the Rule.
65. Compare, for example, the presumption of legitimacy: a child conceived or born
while its mother was married is the legitimate offspring of her then-husband, MD. CODE
ANN., EsT. & TR STS § 1-206(a)&(b) (1991); MD. CODE ANN. FaM. LAW § 5-1028(c) (1991),
with the presumption that loss of or damage to goods in the possession of a bailee is the
result of the bailee's negligence, Commodities Reserve Corp. v. Belt's Wharf Warehouses,
Inc., 310 Md. 365, 529 A.2d 822 (1987), and the presumption, in cases of simultaneous
death in which the descent of property depends upon the order of death, that each person
survived the other, MD. CODE ANN., CTs. &JUD. PROC. §§ 10-801 to -807 (1989).
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Some Subcommittee members took the position that a presump-
tion should shift the burden of persuasion. Others believed that only
the burden of production should be affected. Some thought the
Thayer approach-the bursting bubble theory-was the appropriate
one, while a few believed the introduction of evidence to rebut the
presumption should not entirely obliterate the presumption's effect.
These issues are of interest largely to academics, but rarely to
practitioners orjudges. Ultimately, the rule as adopted codifies Mary-
land law as expounded in Grier v. Rosenberg.66 Under Rule 5-301, pre-
sumptions do not affect the burden of persuasion. A presumption
merely satisfies the burden of production on the fact presumed and,
in the absence of rebutting evidence, may satisfy the burden of persua-
sion. If there is rebutting evidence, the presumption retains only
enough vitality to create a jury question on the issue, and the jury is
instructed on the presumption. Thus, having left no stone unturned
in the investigation of the law of presumptions, Rule 5-301 left each
precisely as it found it.
Finally, Rule 5-301(b), which has no federal analog, treats the
problem of conflicting presumptions with the direction that the court
apply "the one that is founded on weightier considerations of policy
and logic." Policy and logic, however, may conflict, and it is unlikely
that this formulation will prove helpful.
Rule 5-302 is essentially a conflict of laws rule.67 It declares that
the effect of a presumption should be determined by the law that sup-
plies the presumption.
VI. CHAPTER 400-RELEvANcY AND ITS LIMITS
As already discussed in Part I, Rules 5-401, 5-402, and 5-403 pro-
vide the critical foundation of the new Maryland Rules.68 The remain-
der of Chapter 400 comprises particular manifestations of those rules
as applied through many years of common-law development, at times
modified by particular policy choices.
Rule 5-404 codifies the common-law propensity rule for character
evidence, which provides, with certain exceptions noted in the Rule,
that evidence of character is not admissible to prove that a person
acted in conformity therewith. Paragraph (b) makes clear that con-
duct evidence may be admissible if offered for some relevant proposi-
66. 213 Md. 248, 131 A.2d 737 (1957).
67. The federal analog to 5-302 treats Erie problems or vertical choice of law; the Mary-
land Rule is concerned with horizontal or interstate choice of law questions.
68. See supra notes 12-17 and accompanying text.
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tion other than character. None of this is new to Maryland practice.6"
Although, the language of Rule 5-404 is identical to Federal Rule 404,
the requirement in State v. Faulkner" that such conduct be established
by "clear and convincing evidence" is retained.71 The Maryland Rule
rejects, as it should, the holding of Huddleston v. United States,7" in
which the Supreme Court read Federal Rule 104(b) to require only
that a reasonable jury could find the other conduct.7" The higher
standard is consistent with Rule 5-403's balancing of probativity and
prejudice. Given the potential prejudice that other conduct evidence
may produce, it is sensible to ensure that such evidence is accurate
before admitting it. Perhaps for this reason, the Federal Rules were
recently amended to require that the prosecution give notice of its
intention to use Rule 404(b) evidence,74 presumably to allow the op-
ponent of the evidence the opportunity to rebut it. This notice re-
quirement is not part of the Maryland Rule.
The exceptions to the exclusion of character as propensity evi-
dence are familiar: The accused in a criminal proceeding (including
a child alleged to be delinquent75 ) may offer evidence of good charac-
ter, although if she does, the state may rebut it with evidence of poor
character for the trait in question;76 a witness's credibility may be im-
peached by relevant character evidence; 77 and, a criminal defendant
may offer relevant evidence of the victim's characterT7 -for example,
the victim's aggressive character may be offered in an assault prosecu-
tion to show the victim was the first aggressor-and the prosecution
may offer rebutting evidence.
Less cogent than the justification for the prosecution's use of evi-
dence to rebut the defendant's use of character evidence is to permit
the state to offer evidence of the victim's pacific character in a homi-
cide prosecution to rebut any evidence, whether or not character evi-
dence, that the victim was the first aggressor. Under Rule 5-
404(a) (1) (B), the state may offer character evidence of the peaceable-
ness of the victim in a homicide case if the defendant offers, for exam-
69. See Harris v. State, 324 Md. 490, 495, 597 A.2d 956, 960 (1961) (holding evidence of
bad acts may be admissible if offered on a basis other than to prove propensity to commit a
crime).
70. 314 Md. 630, 552 A.2d 896 (1989).
71. Id. at 634, 522 A.2d at 898.
72. 485 U.S. 681 (1988); see supra text accompanying note 52.
73. Huddeston 485 U.S. at 690.
74. FED. R. EvID. 404(b). The amendment became effective December 1, 1991.
75. MD. R. 5-404(a) (2).
76. MD. R. 5-404(a)(1)(A).
77. MD. R. 5-404(a)(1)(C); see MD. R. 5-607, 5-608, 5-609.
78. MD. R. 5-404(a) (1) (B). ButseeMD. R. 5-412; MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 461A (1992).
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ple, eye witness testimony that the victim was the first aggressor, even
though the defendant may have offered no character evidence at all.
Finally, Rule 5404 overrules Bugg v. Brown,79 which had permit-
ted the use of character evidence of the victim in civil cases if the
nature of the conduct alleged would also have constituted a crime. °
Under Rule 5-404 such evidence is available only in the criminal pros-
ecution itself.
In those instances in which evidence of character is admissible,
Rule 5-405 provides that the evidence may be in the form of opinion
or reputation. In the relatively rare case in which character is itself in
issue, where no inference of conduct is sought to be drawn from char-
acter, relevant specific instances of conduct are also admissible. The
language of Rule 5-405 follows the Federal Rule. Perhaps the most
important change from prior Maryland practice is the disapproval of
Hemingway v. State,81 in which the Court of Special Appeals permitted
inquiry into prior specific conduct to provide a "basis" for a character
witness's opinion. 2 Rule 5-405 recognizes the difficulty of asking a
jury to master so fine a distinction as the use of specific instances as a
basis for the character witness's opinion, while not considering it as
evidence of character.
Rule 5-406 codifies prior Maryland law on the admissibility of
habit/routine practice evidence. It is substantively identical to Fed-
eral Rule 406. While the Federal Rule explicitly eliminated the need
for corroborating evidence or the lack of eyewitnesses, these prerequi-
sites were not a part of Maryland law, and, hence, the Maryland Rule
is silent about them.
Rule 5-407, which prohibits the use of subsequent remedial meas-
ures to prove culpable conduct, is based as much on policy as on
probativity. Consideration of this Rule, substantively the same as Fed-
eral Rule 407, provoked enormous controversy within the bar. The
Rule changes Maryland law in an important respect. Under Wilson v.
Moris,83 subsequent remedial measures were admissible to establish
"standard of care." 4 The Rules Committee accepted the Court of Ap-
peals' invitation to reconsider this principle, and the adoption of Rule
5-407 eliminates this too fine distinction; subsequent remedial meas-
ures are not admissible to show culpability, whether framed in terms
79. 251 Md. 99, 246 A.2d 235 (1968).
80. Id. at 106-07, 246 A.2d at 239-40 (assault).
81. 76 Md. App. 127, 543 A.2d 879 (1988).
82. Id. at 132-36, 543 A.2d at 881-83.
83. 317 Md. 284, 563 A.2d 392 (1989).
84. Id. at 298-301, 563 A.2d at 397-400.
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of standard of care or the violation of the standard. Of course, subse-
quent remedial measures may be admissible for some other purpose,
as delineated in Rule 5-407(b).
Consideration of Rule 5-407 provided an opportunity to clarify a
number of difficult issues including whether the Rule applies to prod-
ucts liability cases, a matter of continuing controversy in the federal
courts.85 Courts that hold the Rule applicable must also decide the
meaning of "subsequent," that is, whether the term denotes events
after manufacture or after plaintiffs injury. The Subcommittee rec-
ommended that the Rule apply to products liability cases and that the
relevant time be after the product entered the stream of commerce.
Also unclear was whether measures taken in response to official direc-
tives should be excluded. The Rule as finally adopted, however, leaves
all of these issues for case-by-case development.86
Rule 5-408 seeks to protect settlement negotiations by making
inadmissible certain evidence that arises out of such negotiations if
offered to show culpability or to impeach by prior inconsistent state-
ment. The Rule extends Maryland's common law87 to include con-
duct as well as statements and does not require artificial locutions
such as "without prejudice" to insulate protected statements.88 The
Maryland Rule explicitly includes mediation, implicit in Federal Rule
408. The protection also extends to the use of civil case compromise
evidence in criminal actions, although it does not bar such use to
show "an effort to obstruct a criminal investigation or prosecution."
Rule 5-409 applies similar protections to offers to pay medical or
similar expenses, whether deliberate, made in the course of settle-
ment negotiations, or uttered spontaneously. The Rule does not ap-
ply to offers to pay for property damage.
Rule 5-410 applies the policies of Rule 5-408 to criminal cases by
insulating, with certain exceptions, pleas, plea agreements, or state-
ments made in the course of plea negotiations. The Rule's protection
extends only to the criminal defendant.
85. Compare Bizzle v. McKesson Corp., 961 F.2d 719, 721 (8th Cir. 1991) (finding evi-
dence of subsequent measures in products liability cases admissible) with Raymond v. Ray-
mond Corp., 938 F.2d 1518, 1521 (1st Cir. 1991) (holding Federal Rules do not allow
introduction of subsequent safety improvements in products liability cases).
86. See, e.g., Troja v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 62 Md. App. 101, 488 A.2d 516 (holding
in strict liability cases evidence of subsequent remedial measures not admissible), cert. de-
nied, 303 Md. 471, 494 A-2d 939 (1985).
87. See, e.g., Mateer v. Reliance Ins. Co., 247 Md. 643, 646, 233 A.2d 797, 799 (1967).
88. See Brown v. Hebb, 167 Md. 535, 548, 175 A. 602, 608 (1934).
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Rule 5-411 prohibits the introduction of evidence of insurance on
the question of negligence or culpability. It is identical to Federal
Rule of Evidence 411 and reflects prior Maryland law.89
Rule 5-412 serves as a pointer to Article 27, Section 461A of the
Maryland Code, which restricts the use of prior sexual history of the
victim in cases of rape or first degree sexual assault. The Rule makes
no change in Maryland law. Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence 413,
414, and 415, as contained in the 1994 Crime Bill, were not consid-
ered by the Rules Committee or the Court of Appeals.9" In any event,
it seems likely that any such provisions would originate in the
legislature.
VII. CHAPTER 600-WiNEssEs
Chapter 600 can be thought of as treating three separate but re-
lated sets of issues: Rules 5-601 through 5-606 treat issues related to
competency; Rules 5-608 through 5-610 and 5-616 treat impeachment
and support; and Rules 5-611 through 5-615 treat questions of
procedure.
A. Competency and Related Issues
Rule 5-601 is generally consistent with prior Maryland law and
declares a general rule of competency, subject to particular excep-
tions. As the cross references adumbrate, the statutory incompetency
for convicted felons9' as well as the "Dead Man's Statute"9 2 survive the
adoption of the new rules. Although Rule 5-601 eliminates categorical
incompetencies, the accompanying Committee Note makes it clear
that a particular witness still may be held incompetent if lacking in
memory, ability to narrate, or other traditional prerequisites to testify.
Rule 5-602 makes explicit that one of these prerequisites is personal
knowledge about the matter that is the subject of the testimony, but
notes the exception for expert witnesses offering opinion evidence
pursuant to Rule 5-703.9 It is consistent with both its federal analog
and prior Maryland law. Rules 5-605 and 5-606(a) prohibit the trial
judge or juror, respectively, from testifying.
Rule 5-606(b) continues the prior Maryland practice that strictly
precludes ajuror's testimony to impeach the verdict, whether with re-
89. See, e.g., Morris v. Weddington, 320 Md. 674, 680, 579 A.2d 762, 765 (1990).
90. See Violent Crime and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, § 40141,
108 Stat. 1796 (1994).
91. MD. CODE ANN., CTS. &JuD. PROC. § 9-104 (1989).
92. Id. § 9-116.
93. See infra text accompanying notes 160-161.
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spect to improper extrinsic or intrinsic influences.94 The comparable
federal rule permits ajuror to testify about extrinsic influences on the
jury's verdict-for example, bribery or newspaper articles improperly
in the jury ,room.95 The original draft of Maryland Rule 5-606(b) had
proposed a similar distinction,96 but the Court of Appeals chose, in-
stead, a strict nonimpeachment rule. The Rule does not prohibit
other evidence of improper influence, but precludes such evidence
out of the mouths of the jurors themselves.
B. Impeachment and Rehabilitation
The place to begin a study of impeachment and support is at the
end of Chapter 600; Rule 5-616 is an omnibus rule on impeachment
and support. Although it does not claim to be exhaustive, the Rule
outlines and summarizes the various modes of impeachment and sup-
port, some of which are addressed in greater detail in other rules in
the chapter. The Rule is generally consistent with prior Maryland law
with a few exceptions discussed below. Rule 5-616 has no counterpart
in the Federal Rules of Evidence. Indeed, the Federal Rules have
been criticized for a lack of completeness in coverage of the law of
impeachment because, for example, they are silent on the question of
impeachment by bias, an area addressed in the Maryland omnibus
rule in 5-616(a) (4) and (b)(3). 7
The structure of Rule 5-616 itself is helpful in understanding the
sometimes confusing subject of impeachment and support. The Rule
divides the subject matter into three parts: Part (a) addresses im-
peachment by cross-examination; part (b) addresses impeachment by
extrinsic evidence; and part (c) addresses rehabilitation and support.
The division of parts (a) and (b) helps to clarify, though not com-
94. Harford Sands, Inc. v. Groft, 320 Md. 136, 577 A.2d 7 (1990); Wernsing v. General
Motors Corp., 298 Md. 406, 470 A.2d 802 (1984).
95. FED. R. EVID. 606(b).
96. Indeed, in early publications of Title 5, Rule 5-606(b) (1), prohibiting juror im-
peachment of the verdict, began with an exception clause pointing to paragraph (b) (3) of
the Rule. The original paragraph (b) (3) excepted evidence of extrinsic influences. When
that exception was deleted, the reference to it in 5-606(b)(1) was neglected, leaving a
reference to a non-existent exception. Later versions of the Rule have corrected the
oversight
97. Such criticism of the Federal Rules is misplaced. The rules permit the introduction
of all relevant evidence unless excluded or limited by some particular rule. Thus, the Fed-
eral Rules function to exclude relevant evidence in particular circumstances or to require
the satisfaction of some condition before the evidence is admitted. If there is no restric-
tion on the use of bias impeachment, and if there is no particular foundation or other
condition that must be established before bias evidence is admissible, there is simply no
reason for a particular rule governing bias impeachment. It is relevant evidence and ad-
missible under Rule 402.
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pletely resolve, the common-law problem of "collateralness." The
common law prohibited the introduction of extrinsic evidence to im-
peach on collateral matters, but permitted it if the matter was not col-
lateral. It was sometimes difficult to tell what counted as "not
collateral." With respect to impeachment by prior inconsistent state-
ment98 and impeachment by contradiction,9 9 the problem remains,
but the other modes of impeachment listed in Rule 616(b) permit
proof by extrinsic evidence. In the parlance of the common law, these
matters are not collateral. 100
Rules 5-616(a) (1) allows cross-examination of a witness regarding
that witness's prior inconsistent statements, and Rule 5-616(b) (1) per-
mits the introduction of extrinsic evidence of the prior inconsistent
statements, as provided under Rule 5-613. Rule 5-613(a) changes the
Maryland common law by modifying the rule in Queen Caroline's
Case.1" 1 Queen Caroline's Rule as applied in Maryland required that a
witness be provided her or his written statement or informed about
the contents, time, place and other circumstances of an oral statement
before the witness could be asked about it.1" 2 The Federal Rules abol-
ished the requirement of Queen Caroline's Case,1 13 as did many of the
state rules modeled on them." Maryland steered a middle course.
Under Rule 5-613(a), it is no longer necessary to disclose the state-
ment or the circumstances in which it was made before inquiring of
the witness, but such disclosure must be made before the end of the
examination, and the witness must be given the opportunity to ad-
dress the matter. Thus, the Rule seeks to strike an appropriate bal-
ance between the needs of impeaching counsel and fairness to
witnesses.
Unlike the Federal Rule, under the Maryland Rule extrinsic evi-
dence of the prior inconsistent statement is not admissible until this
requirement has been met and the witness has denied the statement.
Extrinsic evidence of prior inconsistent statements is still not admissi-
98. MD. R. 5-616(b)(1); MD. R. 613(b).
99. MD. R. 5-616(b) (2).
100. Of course, the introduction of extrinsic evidence meeting the standards of Rule 5-
616(b) may still be excluded for other reasons, including failure to meet the balancing test
of Rule 5-403.
101. 129 Eng. Rep. 976, 977 (1820).
102. See, e.g., Bruce v. State, 318 Md. 706, 729 n.2, 569 A.2d 1254, 1266 n.2 (1990), cert.
denied, 113 S. Ct. 2936 (1993).
103. FED. R. EVID. 613.
104. See, e.g., Aiuz. R. EVID. 613 (1977); IDAHo Cr. R. 613 (1994); VT. R. EVID. 613
(1983); W. VA. R. EvID. 613 (1994).
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ble if the statement concerns a collateral matter. °5 Presumably, the
test of collateralness is governed by the pre-Rules cases. 106
A final caution with respect to the scope of Rules 5-616(a) (1), 5-
616(b) (1) and 5-613: These rules govern impeachment by prior in-
consistent statement. Under certain circumstances, a witness's prior
inconsistent statement may be used as substantive evidence of the
truth of what it asserts. The use of prior inconsistent statements as
substantive evidence is governed by Rule 5-802.1 (a)."0 7 Where the in-
consistent statement is admissible only for purposes of impeachment,
it is impermissible to call the witness merely as a device to present that
witness's prior statements.'0
Rules 5-616(a) (2) and 5-616(b) (2) permit impeachment by con-
tradiction. The witness may be cross-examined about the existence of
contradicting facts, but extrinsic evidence of the contradictory mate-
rial may be admitted only if the matter is not collateral or if the court
exercises its discretion to permit extrinsic evidence of collateral mat-
ters.' 0 9 One might expect the exercise of such discretion where the
matter is collateral in a strict sense but forms the linchpin of the wit-
ness's testimony. A witness might testify, for example, that she re-
members a particular event because it was coincident with some other
event. Though technically collateral, extrinsic evidence of the non-
existence of this other event would tend to call into question the wit-
ness's testimony on the principal matters.110
Rule 5-616(a) (3) permits cross-examination testing the credibility
of an opinion expressed by the witness. Rules 5-616(a) (4) and 5-
616(b) (3) permit the introduction of evidence of bias, prejudice, in-
terest, or other motive to testify falsely, either through cross-examina-
tion or extrinsic evidence, respectively. Unlike impeachment by prior
inconsistent statement, the witness being impeached by extrinsic evi-
dence need not have been given the opportunity to address the im-
peaching fact.111
105. MD. . 5-613(b), 5-616(b)(1).
106. See MD. R. 1-201.
107. See infta Part IX.
108. Bradley v. State, 333 Md. 593, 611-12, 636 A.2d 999, 1008-09 (1994); cf. Spence v.
State, 321 Md. 526, 530, 583 A.2d 715, 717 (1991) (holding it error to call accomplice as
state's witness in order to allow prosecution to "impeach" by prior inconsistent statement
that implicated defendant). The restriction, of course, is inapplicable where the prior in-
consistent statement is offered as substantive evidence. Stewart v. State, No. 94-1006, 1995
WL 136498 (Md. App. Mar. 31, 1995).
109. See Clark v. State, 332 Md. 77, 629 A.2d 1239 (1993).
110. Smith v. State, 273 Md. 152, 162-63, 328 A.2d 274, 280 (1974).
111. See Redditt v. State, 337 Md. 621, 655 A.2d 390 (1995); Petti v. State, 316 Md. 509,
560 A.2d 577 (1989).
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Rule 5-616(a)(5) and 5-616(b)(4) allow impeachment by evi-
dence of lack of knowledge or weaknesses in the witness's memory,
perception or ability to communicate," 2 either through cross-exami-
nation or extrinsic evidence, respectively. Extrinsic evidence may not
be introduced, however, unless the witness has first been examined
about it and refused to admit it, or there is another good reason for
admitting the extrinsic evidence. It should be noted that this mode of
impeachment is closely related to Rule 5-602, which requires personal
knowledge as a matter of witness competency.' 1 3
Rules 5-616(a)(6), 5-616(b)(5), and 5-616(b)(6) address im-
peachment by evidence of the witness's character in the form of prior
bad acts or prior convictions. These Rules are merely pointers to
Rules 5-608 (prior bad acts) and 5-609 (prior convictions). Rule 5-608
addresses the admissibility of evidence of a witness's character for ve-
racity. The Rule is a substantial revision of its federal counterpart.
Rule 5-608(a) provides that a witness's credibility may be challenged
by the testimony of another witness, in the form of reputation or opin-
ion, that the principal witness is not of a truthful character," 4 but the
character witness may not offer an opinion that the principal witness
has testified untruthfully on the particular occasion. 1 The same
kind of evidence, either in the form of reputation or opinion, may be
offered to rehabilitate the principal witness after her character for ve-
racity has been attacked.' 1 6
The Rule essentially overturns Hemingway v. State.'1 7 Hemingway
incongruously held that while a character witness could not testify to
specific instances of conduct as evidence of the relevant trait of char-
acter, he could offer the very same testimony as the basis for his opin-
ion. Rule 5-608(a) (3) (B) recognizes the artificiality of that distinction
and prohibits the character witness from testifying to specific in-
stances on direct examination.
Rule 5-608(b) permits any witness to be cross-examined about her
or his own prior misconduct, not evidenced by conviction," 8 that is
probative of veracity. The cross-examiner, however, must "take the
answer"; such misconduct is not provable by extrinsic evidence." 9 If
112. Eiler v. State, 63 Md. App. 439, 450, 492 A.2d 1320, 1325 (1985).
113. Lambert v. State, 197 Md. 22, 26, 78 A.2d 378, 379 (1951).
114. MD. R. 5-608(a)(1).
115. MD. R. 5-608(a) (3) (A); see Globe Sec. Sys. Co. v. Sterling, 79 Md. App. 303, 308, 556
A.2d 731, 734 (1989).
116. MD. IL 5-608(a)(2).
117. 76 Md. App. 127, 543 A.2d 879 (1988).
118. See MD. R. 5-609.
119. State v. Cox, 298 Md. 173, 179, 468 A.2d 319, 322 (1983).
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called upon to do so, the cross-examiner must be able to demonstrate
a basis for the inquiry.'12 As the Committee Note makes clear, Rule 5-
608(b) addresses only specific instances of conduct offered to prove
character for veracity.
While the Subcommittee worked on the Rules, the Court of Ap-
peals asked that a rule on impeachment by prior conviction be for-
warded to the court for its consideration out of order. In 1992, the
court adopted Rule 1-502, and in the following year, the court con-
strued the Rule in Beales v. State.12 ' New Rule 5-609 is essentially the
same as Rule 1-502; consequently, Beales remains important to its
application.
Rule 5-609 governs the admissibility of evidence of convictions to
impeach a witness. It is unique in at least two respects: First, it is the
only rule-other than Rule 5-402-that purports to require the admis-
sion of evidence. The other rules are either rules of exclusion or rules
that describe procedures for or prerequisites to the admission of evi-
dence. The conditions necessary to invoke the mandatory admission
required under Rule 5-609, the "only if" clause, 12 2 could just as easily
have been framed as a rule of exclusion "unless" the conditions were
satisfied. Nonetheless, the mandatory language suggests the political
values underlying judgments about impeachment by prior convic-
tions. 1' The political question becomes most acute when the im-
peached witness is a criminal defendant who testifies in her own
behalf, because a prior conviction may be used by the jury for more
than the light it sheds on credibility. The specter of the testifying ac-
cused drives the analysis on this issue.
Second, Rule 5-609 is one of the few rules to weigh prejudice to
the witness as well as to the objecting party as a factor in determining
the admissibility of the prior conviction. This is yet another indication
that values other than the truth-finding function of trials are relevant
to the admissibility of prior convictions.
Two conditions must be satisfied for the admission of prior con-
victions to impeach: first, the conviction must satisfy a category re-
quirement, for "an infamous crime" or a crime relevant to credibility;
second, the probative value of the evidence must be found to out-
weigh the danger of unfair prejudice. It is important to note that in
120. Robinson v. State, 298 Md. 193, 201, 468 A.2d 328, 333 (1983).
121. 329 Md. 263, 619 A.2d 105 (1993).
122. MD. R. 5-609(a)(1)-(2).
123. See generally Victor Gold, Impeachment by Conviction Evidence: Judicial Discretion and the
Politics of Rule 609, 15 CAnDozo L. REv. 2295 (1994); James A. Protin, Note, What Is a "Crime
Relevant to Credibility"?, 54 MD. L. REv. 1125 (1995).
1058 [VOL. 54:1032
1995] MARYLAND RULES OF EVIDENCE 1059
Rule 5-609 the prejudice-probativity balance, reminiscent of Rule 5-
403, reverses the result necessary for admissibility. Generally, relevant
evidence is admissible unless its probative value is substantially out-
weighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.124 The admissibility of
prior convictions offered to impeach, however, requires that probative
value outweigh the danger of unfair prejudice. 2 5 In Prout v. State,1 26
the Court of Appeals enumerated the factors to be considered in the
balance. 127 Beales, on the other hand, emphasizes the importance of
the weighing process itself in the determination of whether to admit a
witness's prior conviction on the question of credibility.1 21
Conviction of crimes relevant to credibility, of course, satisfy the
categorical requirement, although what counts as a crime relevant to
credibility remains a matter of some controversy. The archetypical ex-
ample of such a crime is perjury, but convicted perjurers may not of-
fer any testimony in Maryland's courts.'1 9  Crimes that involve
dishonesty or false statement are included, and the Court of Appeals
has decided that this category also includes theft1 30 The Court of
Appeals more recently has held in State v. Giddens"' that "a prior con-
viction for distribution of cocaine is relevant to credibility and, as
124. See supra notes 16-17 and accompanying text.
125. MD. R. 5-609(a) (2).
126. 311 Md. 348, 535 A.2d 445 (1988).
127. Although Prout pre-dates Rule 5-609, the court's discussion of impeachment re-
mains pertinent:
We do not intend to establish rigid guidelines to be followed by the trial judges in
determining the admissibility of impeachment evidence. To do so would be con-
trary to our suggestion that the trial judge exercise a sound discretion in each
case where the issue arises. However, we do suggest a number of factors that
ought be considered by the trial court when addressing this problem. First, acts
of deceit, fraud, cheating, or stealing are generally regarded as reflecting ad-
versely on one's likelihood to be truthful, while acts of violence generally have
little, if any, bearing on honesty and veracity. Second, a conviction for dishonesty,
if followed by a long period of exemplary living, may be too remote to have signif-
icant probative value on the truth-telling process. Another important factor to
remember is that a prior conviction which is similar to the crime for which the
defendant is on trial may have a tendency to suggest to the jury that if the defend-
ant did it before he probably did it this time. The above factors are by no means
exhaustive and are only offered as examples of the kind of matters which the trial
judge may consider in determining the consequence of admitting this kind of
impeachment evidence.
Id. at 364, 535 A.2d at 452-53.
128. Beaes, 329 Md. at 270, 619 A.2d at 108.
129. MD. CODE ANN., CTS. &JUD. PRoc. § 9-104 (1989).
130. Beaes, 329 Md. at 270, 619 A.2d at 108.
131. 335 Md. 205, 642 A.2d 870 (1994).
MARYLAND LAW REVIWV
such, is admissible under [Rule 5-609],"132 but a prior conviction for
simple possession of narcotics is not within the category of crimes rele-
vant to credibility.13 3 The Giddens court's rationale is as disturbing as
its result. The conviction was relevant to credibility not because the
elements of the offense involved dishonesty, but because it was the
sort of crime likely to be carried out "surreptitiously."134 Nevertheless,
the Court purports to continue to articulate the notion that the partic-
ulars of the violation do not determine whether the conviction satis-
fies the category requirement.1 3 5 Under the law in effect prior to the
adoption of the new rules, only the fact of conviction is admissible but
not the details of the offense; 3 6 this rule is likely to remain
unchanged.
Infamous crimes also qualify for inclusion as prior convictions
that may be used to impeach. Strangely, this category still includes
treason and those crimes which constituted felonies under the com-
mon law before 1864, when Maryland's criminal law began to be codi-
fied. 3 7  At least Federal Rule of Evidence 609 speaks of prior
convictions for current day felonies. The relevance of this category of
infamous crimes to matters of veracity is surely problematic and,
again, demonstrates the political undercurrent stirred by the question
of the admissibility of prior convictions.
The last section of Rule 5-616 addresses the rehabilitation of wit-
nesses after impeachment. The impeached witness may deny or ex-
plain the impeaching facts,138 except to deny guilt in prior convictions
proven by the witness's own testimony or by public record in accord-
ance with Rule 5-609.139 Prior consistent statements that tend to rebut
132. Id. at 217, 642 A.2d at 876; see also State v. Woodland, 337 Md. 519, 654 A-2d 1314
(1995) (holding conviction for possession of a controlled dangerous substance with intent
to distribute is an impeachable offense relevant to credibility).
133. Morales v. State, 325 Md. 330, 339, 600 A.2d 851, 855 (1992).
134. Giddens, 335 Md. at 216-17, 642 A.2d at 875-76. In the wake of Giddens, the court
has more recently held that a charge of drug dealing operates as an attack on the defend-
ant's credibility such that if the defendant testifies, he may also introduce evidence of his
character for veracity even if his credibility is not otherwise attacked. Sahin v. State, 337
Md. 304, 310, 635 A.2d 452, 455 (1995); Wilson v. State, 103 Md. App. 722, 654 A.2d 936
(1995).
135. See, e.g., State v. Duckett, 306 Md. 503, 510 A.2d 253 (1986).
136. Foster v. State, 304 Md. 439, 468-71, 499 A.2d 1236, 1251-52 (1985), cert. dened, 478
U.S. 1010 (1986).
137. See Garitee v. Bond, 102 Md. 379, 383, 62 A. 631, 633 (1905).
138. MD. R. 5-609(c); see Green v. State, 25 Md. App. 679, 695 n.SA, 337 A.2d 729, 738
n.5A (1975).
139. MD. R. 5-616(c)(1).
1060 [VOL. 54:1032
MARYLAND RuLEs OF EVIDENCE
the impeachment may be introduced,4 0 subject to statutory excep-
tions."' An impeached witness may be rehabilitated by character wit-
nesses who testify in the form of reputation or opinion to the witness's
character for veracity in accordance with Rule 5-608 (a). 14' Rule 5-616
concludes with a catch-all provision that permits rehabilitation by
other evidence relevant to the purpose.' 43
C. Procedures
Rule 5-611 makes clear the court's power to control what tran-
spires in the courtroom. The discretion provided the trial court serves
two purposes. First, it promotes greater efficiencies and, in general,
allows trials to proceed more smoothly. Second, it serves to reduce
appeals based on technical objections that pertain to such issues as
the propriety of permitting rebuttal or leading questions.
Paragraph (b) adopts Maryland's limited cross-examination
rule, 1" but permits, in the court's discretion, cross-examination be-
yond the scope of the direct "as if on direct," that is, without the use of
leading questions. Leading is also the subject matter of paragraph
(c), which states a general principle of nonleading direct examination
unless the witness is hostile, an adverse party, or identified with an
adverse party-a slight extension of prior Maryland law.1 45
Rule 5-611(b) (2) establishes a rule of wide open cross-examina-
tion in one circumstance: Typically, a witness who the cross-examiner
wishes to question on matters beyond the scope of the direct examina-
tion may be recalled during the cross-examiner's case-in-chief. If,
however, the witness is a criminal defendant, the State may be barred
from recalling the defendant as its own witness. In this situation, an
accused who elects to testify on the merits may be cross-examined with
respect to any issue in the case. In effect, the choice to testify on the
merits operates as a waiver of the accused's privilege against self-in-
crimination."4 If the accused testifies only as to preliminary matters,
the privilege is not waived and the accused may not be cross-examined
140. Cf MD. R. 5-802.1 (b) (permitting prior consistent statements offered to rebut claim
of recent fabrication or improper influence or motive as exception to hearsay rule); Boone
v. State, 33 Md. App. 1, 6, 363 A.2d 550, 554 (1976).
141. MD. R. 5-616(c)(2); MD. CODE ANN., Crs. &JuD. PROC. § 9-117 (1989).
142. MD. R. 5-616(c) (3).
143. MD. R. 5-616(c) (4).
144. See Bruce v. State, 318 Md. 706, 726-27, 569 A.2d 1254, 1264-65 (1990), cert. denied,
113 S. Ct. 2936 (1993).
145. See MD. CODE ANN., CTS. &JuD. PROC. § 9-113 (1989) (excluding hostile witnesses).
146. Cf Booth v. State, 327 Md. 142, 165, 608 A.2d 162, 173 (1992).
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except with regard to the preliminary matters and issues affecting
credibility.147
Under Rule 5-612, if a witness, while testifying, uses a writing or
other item to refresh her recollection, any other party is entitled to
inspect it, examine the witness about it, and impeach the witness's
recollection by introducing relevant portions in evidence. The Rule
differs from its federal counterpart in two important ways. First, Fed-
eral Rule of Evidence 612 is limited by its terms to adverse parties,
whereas any party may take advantage of the Maryland rule, eliminat-
ing the tedium of determining who is an "adverse party" for purposes
of the Rule. Second, and perhaps more important, the Federal Rule
applies to material used by the witness while on the stand and, in the
court's discretion, to writings used before the witness took the stand.
The Maryland Rule is limited to material used by the witness while
testifying, although it extends to items beyond writings. As a conse-
quence, the Maryland Rule will rarely be useful. Surely, Maryland's
lawyers will understand that the item used to refresh recollection can
be insulated by allowing the witness to review it immediately prior to
taking the stand. It is questionable whether the discovery rules are
sufficiently comprehensive to alleviate the dangers inherent in the
Rule's limitation.
Rule 5-614 establishes the court's authority to call and question
witnesses and provides certain safeguards to the parties when the
court elects to do SO. 1 4 8
Rule 5-615 governs the sequestration of witnesses and provides a
single locus for sequestration rules.' 49 Essentially, the court must or-
der sequestration on a party's request, and may do so on its own mo-
tion. Paragraph (b) of the Rule lists those who may not be excluded.
The Rule departs from prior Maryland law by not excepting a desig-
nated representative of the State in a criminal case, typically (though
not necessarily) a law enforcement official. The Rule also allows, but
does not require, the court to permit the presence of a child witness's
parent or other supportive adult.
VIII. CHAPTER 700-OPINIONS AND EXPERT TESTIMONY
Rule 5-701 is the only rule in Chapter 700 that is not directed at
expert testimony. But for the advantages of following the Federal
147. See MD. R. 5-104(d).
148. See also MD. R 2-514(b), 3-514(b), 5-706; cf. Spence v. State, 321 Md. 526, 583 A.2d
715 (1991) (holding it error to call accomplice as court's wimess in order to allow prosecu-
tion to "impeach" by prior inconsistent statement that implicates the defendant).
149. See MD. R. 2-513, 3-513, 4-321; MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 620 (1992 & Supp. 1994).
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Rules of Evidence organizational structure, Rule 5-701 could have
been placed as easily in Chapter 600, devoted to witnesses and their
testimony. Rule 5-701 is substantively identical to its Federal analog.
It permits lay witnesses to testify in the form of opinion or inference if
rationally based on the witness's perception and helpful to an under-
standing of the witness's testimony.
Rule 5-702 permits expert testimony on the same basis as lay testi-
mony, except that the expert witness need not have perceived the
matter about which the testimony is offered. The Rule provides three
criteria to determine whether the testimony will assist the trier of fact:
whether the expert is qualified; 5 ' whether the subject matter is ap-
propriate for expert testimony;"' and whether there is a sufficient
basis for the testimony. 5 By establishing criteria that determine
whether the testimony will assist the trier of fact, the Rule provides
more guidance than Federal Rule 702 but is not inconsistent with its
federal counterpart or with prior Maryland case law.'
Prior to the adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence, the pre-
vailing test for the admissibility of novel scientific evidence was the Frye
test of "general acceptance" in the relevant scientific community.'5 4
With the adoption of the Federal Rules, the continued viability of the
Frye test was called into question. Some courts found Frye superseded
by the new rules;' 55 others interpreted the new Rule 702 as incorpo-
rating the Frye test.1 56 The Supreme Court resolved this conflict in
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc."' The Daubert Court held
that Frye did not survive the Federal Rules as a determinative test of
admissibility, although acceptance in the relevant scientific commu-
nity remains a factor to be considered in the application of Federal
Rule 702.
150. If the State has established licensing credentials in a particular field, the wimess
must meet those qualifications. See, e.g., State v. Bricker, 321 Md. 86, 93, 581 A.2d 9, 13
(1990) (psychologists); cf. Yount v. State, 99 Md. App. 207, 215-16, 636 A.2d 50, 54 (1994).
151. See Stebbing v. State, 299 Md. 331, 350, 473 A.2d 903, 912, cert. denied, 469 U.S. 900
(1984).
152. See Evans v. State, 322 Md. 24, 27, 585 A.2d 204, 205 (1991).
153. See Oken v. State, 327 Md. 628, 659-60, 612 A.2d 258, 273 (1992), cert. denied, 113 S.
Ct. 1312 (1993). See generaly Kevin M. Carroll, Note, Codifying Expert Testimony: Why Tradi-
tional Analysis Should Be Generally Acceptabe, 54 Mn. L. REv. 1085 (1995).
154. Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
155. See, e.g., United States v. Williams, 583 F.2d 1194, 1197 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied,
439 U.S. 1117 (1979).
156. See, e.g., Christophersen v. Allied Signal Corp., 939 F.2d 1106, 1110 (5th Cir. 1991),
cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1280 (1992).
157. 113 S. Ct. 2786 (1993).
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Because Title 5 of the Maryland Rules was promulgated after the
Supreme Court's Daubert decision, one might infer that Maryland's
version of Fye, Reed v. State,"'8 did not survive its adoption or that
adoption of new Rule 5-702 carried implicit approval of the Supreme
Court's recent interpretation of its federal counterpart. The Court of
Appeals, however, made it clear that Rule 5-702 did not necessarily
carry with it that approval. The Committee Note to the Rule suggests
neither approval nor disapproval of the Reed doctrine, but subsequent
case law development indicates that Reed survives adoption of Title
5.159
Rule 5-703 elaborates on the basis on which the expert witness
relies as a criterion of admissibility of expert testimony established by
Rule 5-702. Paragraph (a) of Rule 5-703 is identical to Federal Rule
703. It establishes that the expert witness may base an opinion on first
hand knowledge or on information supplied by others, including
hearsay or through hypothetical questions, if the information is "of a
type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field." The
question whether the information meets this standard is for the
court.160
Paragraphs (b) and (c) have no analog in the Federal Rule. Para-
graph (b) provides for the admissibility of otherwise inadmissible ba-
ses of expert opinion in the court's discretion for the limited purpose
of allowing the jury to evaluate the opinion, if the basis is "trustworthy,
necessary to illuminate testimony, and unprivileged."161 In what is,
perhaps, an excess of caution, Paragraph (c) iterates the right to cross-
examine an expert witness.
Rule 5-704(a) is consistent with both Federal Rule of Evidence
704 and with prior Maryland practice. Otherwise admissible opinion
testimony is not rendered inadmissible simply because it embraces an
ultimate issue in the case.1 62 Despite the broad language of para-
graph (a), Rule 704(b), like its federal counterpart, prohibits expert
testimony on a criminal defendant's mental state, if it constitutes an
element of the offense charged.1 63 Yet, the last sentence of the Rule,
in apparent contradiction, permits opinion testimony on the ultimate
issue of criminal responsibility. Despite the confusing language of the
158. 283 Md. 374, 391 A.2d 364 (1978).
159. See United States Gypsum Co. v. Baltimore, 336 Md. 145, 182-83, 647 A.2d 405, 423
(1994) (upholding Reed).
160. MD. R. 5-104(a).
161. MD. R. 5-703(b); see, e.g., Maryland Dep't of Human Resources v. Bo Peep Day
Nursery, 317 Md. 573, 589, 565 A-2d 1015, 1023 (1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1067 (1990).
162. See, e.g., Cook v. State, 84 Md. App. 122, 142, 578 A.2d 283, 293 (1990).
163. See Hartless v. State, 327 Md. 558, 573, 611 A.2d 581, 588 (1992).
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Rule, it continues prior Maryland law that permits an expert to opine
whether an accused is sane or insane within the legal meaning of
those terms, but not whether the accused lacked the specific intent
that constitutes an element of the offense charged.
This seems quite backwards. The question of legal responsibility
is surely governed by a legal rather than a medical standard. Under
the Rule, an expert may be able to testify about whether an accused
meets a particular standard, but should not have anything to contrib-
ute about what that standard comprises. On the other hand, an ex-
pert would seem qualified to testify about whether a particular person
had the capacity to form a particular intent, yet the Rule prohibits the
expert from doing so.
Rule 5-705 is consistent with its federal counterpart, but changes
prior Maryland law. Under the Rule, an expert may offer an opinion
before testifying as to its basis. Prior Maryland law required testimony
as to the basis of the opinion first.164 The change is not likely to make
much of a difference, as the basis must still be provided if sought on
cross-examination, and the party proffering the testimony is likely to
offer the basis in any event in order to establish the soundness of the
opinion. Modern discovery rules, moreover, make it unlikely that the
opponent of the evidence will be unfamiliar with the basis if not of-
fered in court before the opinion it supports.
Rule 5-706 governs the court's authority to call and examine wit-
nesses and is the analog, for expert witnesses, of Rule 5-614.165 Rule 5-
706 supplies detail helpful to the court's exercise of its inherent au-
thority. The Rule is essentially the same as its federal counterpart.
IX. CHAPTER 800-HEARSAY
The rules that govern the admission or exclusion of hearsay evi-
dence mark some significant changes in Maryland's common law of
evidence as well as some important departures from the Federal
Rules. Yet, these differences should not be overstated. In the main,
Chapter 800 of Title 5 contains few surprises; there is more similarity
than difference among Maryland's common law, the Federal Rules,
and the new Maryland evidence rules.
Rule 5-801, like its federal counterpart, begins with a series of
definitions. The heart of the matter is found in paragraph (c), which
defines hearsay as "a statement, other than one made by the declarant
164. See, e.g., Hunt v. State, 321 Md. 387, 423, 583 A.2d 218, 235 (1990), cert. denied, 502
U.S. 835 (1991).
165. See supra note 148 and accompanying text; see also MD. R 2-514, 3-514.
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while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the
truth of the matter asserted." Paragraphs (a) and (b) define state-
ment and declarant, respectively. A "statement" is defined as an asser-
tion or nonverbal conduct "intended... as an assertion."
Perhaps to the chagrin of some in the professoriate who reveled
in creating bizarre hypotheticals to bedevil evidence students, the im-
plied assertion doctrine of Wright v. Tatham,'6' which had been fol-
lowed in Maryland,167 has been laid to a merciful rest. Under the
implied assertion doctrine, the conduct of a person from which one
could draw an inference of that person's belief was viewed as hearsay
if offered to prove the truth of the inferred belief, regardless of
whether the person intended to communicate the truth of that belief.
Wright v. Tatham provided the classic hypothetical: A ship's captain
was seen to have inspected a particular vessel, after which he took his
family on board and sailed off. If offered to prove the seaworthiness
of the vessel, the captain's nonverbal conduct would have been classi-
fied as hearsay because the captain was unavailable for cross-examina-
tion. The danger that the captain might have been mistaken in his
belief was viewed as reason enough to classify the conduct as hearsay.
The Federal Rule and Maryland Rule 5-801 would classify the ship
captain's conduct as circumstantial evidence of the vessel's seaworthi-
ness, rather than as the captain's implied assertion that the vessel was
seaworthy. In the absence of an intention to assert, the conduct is
unlikely to raise questions of sincerity. Any problems of ambiguity,
against which the hearsay rule is designed to protect, should be appar-
ent to the fact finder as the strength of the circumstantial inference is
decided.
After defining hearsay in Federal Rule of Evidence 801 (c) as an
out-of-court statement offered for its truth, Federal Rule 801 (d) im-
mediately declares a number of categories of statements squarely
within the definition to be non-hearsay: certain prior statements of
testifying witnesses1" and party admissions.16 9 This self-contradiction
dictated a different approach in the Maryland Rules, and one will look
in vain for the Maryland counterpart to Federal Rule 801 (d). Instead,
the Maryland Rules treat these categories as hearsay exceptions within
Rules 5-802.1 and 5-803(a), respectively.
Although Title 5 departs from the structure of the Federal Rules,
the result is a more coherent treatment of these categories of out-of-
166. 112 Eng. Rep. 488 (1837).
167. See, e.g., Waters v. Waters, 35 Md. 531, 544-45 (1872).
168. FED. R. EvID. 801 (d)(1).
169. FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2).
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court statements, as well as a more rational classification scheme for
exceptions to the hearsay rule. Following Rule 5-802, which states the
classic prohibition against the use of hearsay evidence, Title 5 divides
the hearsay exceptions into three categories: prior statements by testi-
fying witnesses, 170 statements by those whose availability to testify is
irrelevant,71 and statements by those who are unavailable to testify.172
Rule 5-802.1 creates a set of exceptions to the hearsay rule for
certain prior statements of testifying witnesses. It is the Maryland ana-
log to Federal Rule 801(d) (1), although there are some important
substantive differences. The Maryland Rule declares five categories of
prior statements by testifying witnesses that are excepted from the rule
against hearsay. For each category, it is necessary that the declarant
testify and be subject to cross-examination concerning the statement.
Thus, the Rule adopts the view that, for these statements, cross-exami-
nation of the declarant at the time of trial is a sufficient safeguard,
and that cross-examination at the time the statements were made is
not required.
Rule 5-802.1 (a) excepts from the rule against hearsay prior incon-
sistent statements if: (1) given under oath at a trial, hearing or other
official proceeding, or in a deposition, (2) written and signed by the
declarant, or (3) recorded verbatim electronically or stenographically.
As the Committee Note makes clear, the Rule must be carefully distin-
guished from Rule 5-613, which governs impeachment by prior state-
ments.17 3  The instant Rule permits the prior statement to be
introduced substantively, as evidence of the truth of what it asserts,
not merely to cast doubt on the credibility of the testifying witness.' 74
The exception is somewhat broader than its federal counterpart with
its addition of the last two categories to prior statements made under
oath at a trial or in a similar proceeding. Rule 5-802.1 (a) codifies and
somewhat extends the Court of Appeals' decision in Nance v. State,1 75
which allows certain prior inconsistent statements to be used as sub-
stantive evidence.
Rule 5-802.1 (b) excepts from the hearsay rule prior consistent
statements offered to rebut a charge that the witness's testimony has
been fabricated. The exception is consistent with its federal analog,
170. MD. R. 5-802.1.
171. MD. R. 5-803.
172. MD. R. 5-804.
173. See supra text accompanying notes 101-108.
174. See Makell v. State, No. 94-1048, 1995 WL 141215, at 30-31 (Md. App. Apr. 4, 1995);
Stewart v. State, No. 94-1006, 1995 WL 136498 (Md. App. Mar. 31, 1995).
175. 331 Md. 549, 629 A.2d 633 (1993); see supra note 174.
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but expands prior Maryland law, which had permitted prior consistent
statements only to rehabilitate a witness after impeachment by prior
inconsistent statement.1 7 6 Despite the deletion of the word "recent"
modifying "fabrication," as in the Federal Rule, 7 v it is likely that the
Maryland courts will follow the federal lead and construe the Rule to
require that the prior consistent statement be made before the motive
to fabricate had arisen.
178
Rule 5-802.1(c) codifies existing Maryland law that holds prior
identifications by testifying witnesses are not barred by the rule against
hearsay.1 79  The Rule is essentially identical to its federal
counterpart. 18 0
Rule 5-802.1(d) creates a hearsay exception for prompt state-
ments of complaint of sexually assaultive behavior on the declarant if
consistent with the declarant's testimony. The Federal Rules contain
no special provision for such statements, and the Rule may expand
prior Maryland law, which had recognized such an exception in crimi-
nal rape cases.1 8 '
Rule 5-802.1 (e) is the traditional hearsay exception for past recol-
lection recorded and substantively mirrors Federal Rule 803(5). The
exception was moved from Rule 5-803 because it requires the declar-
ant to testify to the foundational elements of the exception.1 82 The
Rule changes prior Maryland practice by eliminating the trial court's
discretion to allow the introduction of the record or memorandum as
an exhibit. This prevents the jury from having the material in the jury
room during deliberations and, perhaps, giving it more weight than
other testimonial evidence.1 83
Rule 5-803 provides a long list of exceptions to the rule against
hearsay. The availability or unavailability of the declarant is irrelevant
to these exceptions. Rule 5-803(a) is the Maryland analog to Federal
Rule 801 (d) (2), to which it is substantively identical. As noted above,
the Maryland Rules treat statements by opposing parties as exceptions
to the rule against hearsay rather than as non-hearsay. The Maryland
Rules change the heading of this section from "Admission by Party
176. See MD. R. 5-616(c) (2).
177. FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(B).
178. See Tome v. United States, 115 S. Ct. 696 (1995).
179. Makell v. State, No. 94-1048, 1995 WL 141215; Nance v. State, 331 Md. 549, 551,
629 A.2d 633, 639 (1993); Bedford v. State, 293 Md. 172, 177-78, 443 A.2d 78, 81 (1982).
180. FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(C).
181. See State v. Werner, 302 Md. 550, 563, 489 A.2d 1119, 1125-26 (1985).
182. Mouzone v. State, 294 Md. 692, 701, 452 A.2d 661, 666 (1982).
183. See Henry v. State, 324 Md. 204, 238-39, 596 A.2d 1024, 1041-42 (1991), cert, denied,
112 S. Ct. 1590 (1992).
1068 [VOL. 54:1032
MARYLAND RuLEs OF EVIDENCE
Opponent""8 4 to "Statement by Party-Opponent" 1 5 in an attempt to
avoid the occasional confusion between admissions and statements
against interest. The former need not be against the interest of the
declarant at the time the statement was made, so long as the statement
is that of a party within the meaning of the Rule and another party
seeks to have it admitted.1
8 6
The Rule describes five categories of statements that may qualify
as statements of a party-opponent. Obviously, a party's own state-
ments qualify,187 as do statements that the party has adopted by mani-
festing a belief in their truth. l 8 If a party has authorized another to
speak for her, statements made by the authorized speaking agent qual-
ify as statements of the party.18 9 Statements made by a party's agent or
employee about matters within the scope of the relationship and
made during the relationship also are considered statements by the
party for purposes of the hearsay exception.19° For similar reasons,
statements by co-conspirators during the course of and in furtherance
of the conspiracy are considered statements of the party.' 9 '
Interestingly, the theory underlying the admissions exception,
that a party has no cause to complain about an inability to cross-ex-
amine her own statements, 92 fades as one proceeds through the list
of what qualifies as a statement by a party opponent. Obviously, one
might well wish to cross-examine a co-conspirator or a former em-
ployee who may have made a statement while in the party's employ. It
may be that such statements are valuable contributions to the search
for truth, but the theory on which they are admitted ought to reflect
that idea rather than the tenuous notion of the party's responsibility
for the declarant's words.
As the Committee Note emphasizes, the foundational elements
must be satisfied before a statement is admissible under these excep-
tions. For example, if the statement is offered as a co-conspirator's
statement under Rule 5-803(a) (5), the court must find that there was
a conspiracy, that the declarant and the party against whom the state-
184. FED. R. EVID. 801(d) (2).
185. MD. R. 5-803(a).
186. See, e.g., Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co. v. Kuhl, 296 Md. 446, 457, 463 A.2d 822, 828
(1983).
187. MD. R. 5-803(a)(1).
188. MD. R. 5-803(a) (2); see Brandon v. Molesworth, No. 94-791, 1995 WL 131488, at 32
(Md. App. Mar. 29, 1995).
189. MD. R. 5-803(a) (3).
190. MD. R. 5-803(a) (4); see B & K Rentals & Sales Co. v. Universal Leaf Tobacco Co.,
324 Md. 147, 156-57, 596 A.2d 640, 645 (1991).
191. MD. R. 5-803(a)(5).
192. Brown v. State, 317 Md. 417, 420-21, 564 A.2d 772, 773-74 (1989).
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ment is offered were members of the conspiracy, and that the state-
ment was within the scope of and in furtherance of the conspiracy
before the statement may be admitted. t9
The Rule leaves open the question whether the court may use the
disputed statement as evidence to decide that the foundational facts
have been established. 94 The Supreme Court has held that under
the Federal Rule the disputed statement may be considered as evi-
dence of the foundational facts that must be established before the
disputed statement is admissible. 95 In the past, Maryland has been
reluctant to permit this sort of bootstrapping of a statement into
evidence. 96
Rule 5-803(b) is the Maryland analog to Federal Rule 803. The
numbering system for the hearsay exceptions under the two rules are
the same, although Title 5 leaves two numbers vacant. Rule 5-
803(b) (5) is a cross reference to Rule 5-802.1 (e) and corresponds sub-
stantively to Federal Rule 803(5), which provides an exception to the
hearsay rule for past recollection recorded and defines the founda-
tion necessary to invoke the exception. Rule 5-803(b) (22) would have
been the analog to Federal Rule 803(22), which provides a hearsay
exception for judgments of conviction to prove the facts essential to
the conviction, but Maryland chose not to adopt that particular excep-
tion as part of Tide 5.197 The number is left vacant as a placeholder in
order to maintain, as closely as possible, the federal numbering
system.
The other hearsay exceptions in Rule 5-803(b) follow the Federal
Rules in organization. With a few minor differences, these provisions
are substantively equivalent to their federal counterparts and follow
prior Maryland law. This is true, for example, of Rules 5-803(b) (1)
and 5-803(b) (2) dealing with present sense impressions and excited
utterances, respectively.
Rule 5-803(b) (3) excepts from the hearsay rule statements of the
declarant's then existing mental, emotional or physical condition, and
resolves a question about which the federal courts are in dispute:
whether a declarant's statement of intent to act in concert with an-
other can be used as evidence that the other person did what the
193. See Daugherty v. Kessler, 264 Md. 281, 291-92, 286 A.2d 95, 100-01 (1992).
194. MD. R. 5-803 committee note.
195. Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 180 (1987).
196. See, e.g., Daugherty, 264 Md. at 292, 286 A.2d at 101; Hlista v. Altevogt, 239 Md. 43,
51, 210 A.2d 153, 157 (1965).
197. See MD. CODE ANN., CTS. &JUD. PROC. § 10-904 (1989).
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statement contemplated.19 A declarant's statement of his own inten-
tion is not barred by the hearsay rule if offered to prove the declarant
acted consistently with his stated intention.19 9 The Maryland Court of
Special Appeals had limited the use of the statement proving the de-
clarant's own post-statement conduct,200 and the new Rule adopts the
same approach. Regardless of one's view on the merits of this issue, it
seems more a question of relevance than of the values underlying the
rule against hearsay.
Rule 5-803(b) (4) provides an exception to the hearsay rule for
statements made for purposes of diagnosis and treatment. It reflects
prior Maryland practice and, thus, is a bit narrower than its federal
cognate. Under Federal Rule 803(4) there is no distinction between
statements made for purposes of diagnosis in contemplation of treat-
ment and such statements made in contemplation of litigation.2 °1
Under the Maryland Rule, statements made for diagnosis in contem-
plation of litigation rather than treatment are not within the
exception. 2
Rule 5-803(b) (5), as we have seen, is merely a place holder. The
hearsay exception for past recollection recorded is found in Rule 5-
802.1 (e).203
Rule 5-803(b) (6) excepts from the rule against hearsay records of
regularly conducted activity. It is the modem version of the common-
law business records exceptions to the hearsay rule. The Rule is con-
sistent both with prior Maryland law2 0 4 and with Federal Rule 803(6),
except that the new Rule is more liberal in its foundational require-
ments than the Federal Rule. Under the Federal Rule, the foundation
must be established by "the testimony of the custodian or other quali-
fied witness."20 5 The Maryland Rule permits a finding of the founda-
tional facts circumstantially. Indeed, business records certified as
meeting the foundational requirements of the Rule are self- authenti-
198. Compare United States v. Jenkins, 579 F.2d 840, 843 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S.
967 (1978) with United States v. Sperling, 726 F.2d 69 (2d Cir.), cert. demied, 467 U.S. 1243
(1984).
199. Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Hillmon, 145 U.S. 285 (1892).
200. Johnson v. State, 38 Md. App. 306, 313-15, 381 A.2d 303, 307-08 (1977).
201. Morgan v. Foretich, 846 F.2d 941, 950 (4th Cir. 1988).
202. See Beahm v. Shortall, 279 Md. 321, 368 A.2d 1005 (1977); cf. Daubert v. Merrell
Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 43 F.3d 1311 (9th Cir. 1995) (expert opinions developed ex-
pressly for purposes of testimony rather than based on pre-existing or independent re-
search is not "good science" and hence not admissible under Federal Rule 702).
203. See supra notes 182-183 and accompanying text.
204. There are some minor differences in language between this Rule and the Maryland
Code. See MD. CoDE ANN., Crs. &JuD. PROC. § 10-101 (1989).
205. FED. R. EviD. 803(b) (6).
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cating.206 As the Committee Note indicates, restrictions on the public
records exception may not be circumvented by resort to Rule 5-
803(b) (6).207
Rule 5-803(b) (7) is the negative equivalent of the preceding ex-
ception. It provides an exception from the hearsay rule for evidence
of the absence of an entry in records of regularly conducted activity to
show the nonexistence of a fact or event that would have been entered
therein if it had existed or occurred. It is consistent with Maryland
law. 208 The language of this exception, which is a bit more stringent
than its federal analog, requires evidence of a diligent search of the
appropriate records.20 9 It is noteworthy that there is no provision in
the authentication rules for certification of the absence of a business
record,21 ° although there is such a provision for the establishment of
the absence of a public record.2 1 1
Rule 5-803(b) (8) is the public records analog to the business
records exception. The Court of Appeals permitted the introduction
of public records in Ellsworth v. Sherne Lingerie, Inc.,2 12 although the
extent to which factual findings in such records or reports were held
to include opinions remains a matter of some controversy. As the
Committee Note declares, the Rule does nothing to clarify that issue.
The Note is a reminder that the Supreme Court's interpretation of
the comparable Federal Rule is not dispositive of how the Maryland
Rule may be interpreted. Specifically, the Supreme Court had deter-
mined that "factual findings" as used in the Rule could embrace con-
clusions or opinions.21t The Committee Note suggests that Maryland
courts are likely to move cautiously on this issue.
As its federal analog, Rule 5-803(b)(8) prohibits the use of
records of observations of law enforcement officers against the ac-
cused in criminal cases. Paragraph (D) of the exception, which has
no federal counterpart, assures that specific statutory provisions that
admit certain kinds of records 14 are not superseded by the more gen-
eral provisions of the Rule.
206. See infra notes 259-260 and accompanying text.
207. See infra text accompanying notes 212-214.
208. See Street v. State, 60 Md. App. 573, 577-79, 483 A.2d 1316, 1318 (1984).
209. Interestingly, the federal hearsay rule exception for absence of an entry in public
records does contain such a requirement. See FED. R. EVID. 803(10).
210. See infra text accompanying notes 259-260.
211. See infra text accompanying note 217.
212. 303 Md. 581, 495 A.2d 348 (1985).
213. Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Rainey, 488 U.S. 153, 162 (1988).
214. See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., Os. & JUD. PROC. § 10-306 (Supp. 1994) (permitting
breathalyzer results without presence or testimony of a technician).
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Application of Rule 5-803(b) (9) requires coordination with cer-
tain provisions of the Maryland Code. The Rule provides a hearsay
exception for public records of vital statistics unless otherwise pro-
vided by statute. Thus, the Rule was designed to retain the statutory
provisions precluding evidence of paternity contained in otherwise ad-
missible public records of vital statistics in certain cases.21 Similarly,
medical examiners' reports continue to be governed by the Code's
Health-General Article, Sections 5-310 and 5-311.216
Rule 5-803(b)(10) is the public records analog to Rule 5-
803(b) (7). It excepts from the hearsay rule evidence of the absence
of a record to show that the matter not recorded did not occur. Like
the business records and public records exceptions, proof of the rec-
ord may be by certification.217
Most of the other exceptions to the rule against hearsay con-
tained in Rule 5-803(b) are of minor significance, and there are few
recent cases reflecting the Maryland common-law view with respect to
them. Some, like Rule 5-803(b) (13), which provides a hearsay excep-
tion for certain kinds of family records, probably reflect existing
law.2"' Others, like Rule 5-803(b) (11), which provides an exception
for certain kinds of records of religious organizations, may broaden
admissibility beyond what might have been permitted under Maryland
common law.2 19 Rules 5-803(b) (12), marriage, baptismal and similar
certificates; 5-803(b) (14), records of documents affecting an interest
in property; 5-803(b) (15), statements in documents affecting an inter-
est in property; 5-803 (b) (17), market reports and published compila-
tions; and 5-803(b) (23), judgments as to personal, family, or general
history, or boundaries, expand to some extent the common-law excep-
tions, but again, there is scant recent authority. Title 5 does not in-
clude an analog to Federal Rule 803(22), which excepts from the rule
against hearsay judgments of conviction offered to prove facts essen-
tial to the judgment.220
A few remaining provisions in Rule 5-803(b), however, deserve
some attention. Rule 5-803(b)(16) establishes an exception to the
hearsay rule that is new to Maryland law. Statements in "ancient docu-
ments" are not barred by the rule against hearsay, unless there is some
215. MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 4-223 (1994).
216. Id. §§ 5-310 to -311.
217. There is no provision for establishing the absence of a business record by certifica-
tion. See MD. R. 5-803(b)(7); MD. R. 5-902.
218. See, e.g., Weaver v. Leiman, 52 Md. 708, 718-20 (1880).
219. 1I at 721-22.




reason to suspect their trustworthiness. Maryland had permitted the
authentication of certain documents by evidence of their age and
other supporting circumstances,2 2 1 but this hearsay exception goes be-
yond satisfaction of the authenticity requirement. Further, a docu-
ment is now "ancient" if it has been in existence for twenty years; the
common-law definition of ancient in the authentication context had
been longer. 2
Rule 5-803(b) (18) creates an important new exception to the
hearsay rule in Maryland: an exception for learned treatises. Prior to
the adoption of Title 5, learned treatises were usable either to im-
peach an expert witness who relied on the work or regarded it as au-
thoritative, or to explain the basis of an expert's opinion, but not as
substantive evidence of the truth of what the work said.223 Under
Rule 5-803(b) (15), the content of the work is admissible for its truth
once it is established as authoritative, and no limiting instruction is
given. As in the case of past recollection recorded,224 the relevant
portion of the work may be read into the record, but may not be ad-
mitted as an exhibit or taken to the jury room. The recognition of a
learned treatise exception may help to level the playing field to some
extent for litigants who can not bear the cost of a plethora of expert
witnesses.
Perhaps the most controversial of the new hearsay exceptions in
Title 5 is Rule 5-803(b) (24), the "catch-all" or residual exception.
Although the exception iterates the language of its federal analog, it
introduces that language with an explicit direction that the exception
is intended for application only "in exceptional circumstances." The
legislative history of the federal residual exceptions also suggested a
limited application. 25 Nevertheless, the federal courts have con-
strued the residual exceptions in widely disparate ways, often quite
liberally. For example, despite the requirement that statements ad-
mitted under the exception must have "equivalent circumstantial
guarantees of trustworthiness" to the other enumerated exceptions,
there are federal cases holding it appropriate to admit hearsay under
the residual exceptions that were "near misses" under one of the
226Yeitiother exceptions. Yet it is difficult to comprehend how a statement
221. See infra text accompanying note 256.
222. See Allender v. Vestry of Trinity Church, 3 Gill. 166, 173-75 (1845) (setting a 30-year
limit).
223. See, e.g., Nolan v. Dillon, 261 Md. 516, 536-37, 276 A.2d 36, 47 (1971).
224. See supra text accompanying notes 182-183.
225. FED. R EvID. 803(b) (24) advisory committee's note.
226. See, e.g., Moffett v. McCauley, 724 F.2d 581, 583 (7th Cir. 1984); United States v.
McPartlin, 595 F.2d 1321, 1350 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 833 (1979). There are also
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that lacks one of the elements of trustworthiness of another exception
can be equivalently trustworthy under the residual exception, unless
there exists some other circumstantial guarantee of trustworthiness
not envisioned by the other exception.
The residual exception requires that the proffered statement
bear circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness. 7 It also must be
offered as a statement of a material fact, though it is unclear whether
this requirement adds anything to the relevancy and materiality re-
quirements of Rule 5-402. The statement must be more probative
than any other evidence that the proponent reasonably can procure,
but the measure of probativity is not defined. For example, it is un-
clear whether the probative value of the proffered statement is mea-
sured against each piece of other evidence for the same proposition
or all such evidence combined. The admission of the statement must
likewise serve "the general purposes of these rules and the interests of
justice," although it is difficult to know precisely what this require-
ment adds. Finally, invocation of the exception requires pre-trial no-
tice to the opponent of the evidence, even though federal decisions
widely disregard the requirement.228
Although there is some support in prior Maryland law for a flexi-
ble approach to exceptions to the rule against hearsay,' the residual
exception of the new rules does not envision a policy of liberal admis-
sibility of hearsay that does not qualify under the specific excep-
tions.2 0 Nonetheless, the precise contours of the exception and the
extent to which federal case law will guide its interpretation must be
left to future case law.
Rule 5-804 contains the final category in Maryland's tripartite
classification scheme of exceptions to the rule against hearsay-state-
ments requiring the unavailability of the declarant. Rule 5-804(a) de-
fines the conditions of unavailability consistently with its federal
counterpart. A declarant who is privileged to refuse to testify is un-
cases to the contrary, finding "near misses" inadmissible under the residual exceptions
precisely because the lack of an element necessary to meet the requirements of an express
exception indicates a lack of equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness. See,
e.g., United States v. Love, 592 F.2d 1022, 1026-27 (8th Cir. 1979).
227. MD. P. 5-803(b)(24).
228. See, e.g., Furtado v. Bishop, 604 F.2d 80, 92 (1st Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1035
(1980); United States v. Bailey, 581 F.2d 341, 348 (3d Cir. 1978). But see United States v.
Ruffin, 575 F.2d 346, 358 (2d Cir. 1978); United States v. Oates, 560 F.2d 45, 72 n.30 (2d
Cir. 1977).
229. See Brown v. State, 317 Md. 417, 425-26, 564 A.2d 772, 776 (1989).




available, 21 as is a witness who refuses to testify despite a court order
to do so. 23 2 A witness who maintains a lack of memory of the subject
matter of her out-of-court statement is unavailable. 33 A declarant
who is unable to testify because of physical or mental illness' or infir-
mity, or who is deceased is unavailable under the Rule. 23 4 Finally, a
declarant is unavailable if absent from the proceeding and the propo-
nent of the statement has been unable to procure the declarant's at-
tendance (if the statement is offered under Rule 5-804(b) (1) or 5-
804(b) (5)) or testimony (if the statement is offered under Rule 5-
804(b) (2), (3) or (4)) by process or other reasonable means.23 5
These categories of unavailability do not depart significantly from
prior Maryland law.236 Also consistent with prior Maryland law is the
common-sense requirement of Rule 804(a) that the proponent of a
hearsay statement may not take advantage of the unavailability of the
declarant if it is "due to the procurement or wrongdoing of the propo-
nent of the statement for the purpose of preventing the witness from
attending or testifying. "237
Rule 5-804(b) (1) excepts from the rule against hearsay prior testi-
mony of unavailable witnesses if the opponent of the evidence or, in
civil cases, "a predecessor in interest, had an opportunity and similar
motive to develop the testimony." The exception is consistent with its
federal counterpart and with modem Maryland practice.23 8
Rule 804(b) (2) provides an exception to the hearsay rule for dy-
ing declarations in certain categories of cases. The Rule goes beyond
its federal counterpart, which is limited to homicide prosecutions and
civil cases.2 39 The Maryland Rule expands what had been previously
231. MD. R. 5-804(a) (1); see Bond v. State, 92 Md. App. 444, 448-51, 608 A.2d 1260, 1260-
62 (1992).
232. MD. R. 5-804(a) (2); see, e.g., Brown v. State, 317 Md. 417, 420-21, 564 A.2d 772, 773-
74 (1991); Gaskins v. State, 10 Md. App. 666, 677-78, 272 A.2d 413, 419-20 (1971), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 1040 (1972).
233. MD. R. 5-804(a) (3); see Bon4 92 Md. App. at 449 n.3, 608 A.2d at 1262 n.3.
234. MD. R. 5-804(a) (4); see, e.g., Contee v. State, 229 Md. 486, 490-92, 184 A.2d 823,
825-26 (1962), cert. denied, 374 U.S. 841 (1963).
235. MD. R. 5-804(a)(5). Compare MD. R. 4-261(h)(1) (permitting deposition testimony
of a wimess unable to testify at a criminal trial) with MD. R. 2-419(a) (3) (B) & (D) (permit-
ting deposition testimony in civil proceedings if declarant is unavailable).
236. See supra notes 231-234. But cf MD. R. 2419(a) (3) (B) & (D), which arguably estab-
lish a looser standard of unavailability for admission of deposition testimony in civil cases.
237. MD. R. 5-804(a); see, e.g., Lindsay v. State, 2 Md. App. 330, 332 n.1, 234 A.2d 479,
481 n.1 (1967); Bryant v. State, 207 Md. 565, 587, 115 A.2d 502, 512 (1955).
238. See United States Gypsum Co. v. Baltimore, 336 Md. 145, 180 n.14, 647 A.2d 405,
422 n.14 (1994); Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. Zenobia, 325 Md. 420, 439-44, 601 A.2d 633, 642-45
(1992).
239. FED. R EVID. 804(b)(2).
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restricted to homicide prosecutions in which the declarant was the
victim. 2" Under Rule 5-804(b) (2), "a statement made by a[n unavail-
able] declarant, while believing that the declarant's death was immi-
nent, concerning the cause or circumstances of what the declarant
believed to be his or her impending death" is not barred by the hear-
say rule in cases of homicide, attempted homicide, assault with intent
to commit a homicide, or civil cases. Thus, the declarant need not be
deceased, although she must be unavailable, and the declarant need
not be the victim.
Rule 804(b) (3) contains the declaration against interest excep-
tion to the rule against hearsay. It is substantively identical to its fed-
eral analog 41 and reflects prior Maryland law. 242 Statements against
the pecuniary, proprietary, or penal interest of an unavailable declar-
ant such that the declarant would have been unlikely to have made
the statement if it were not true are excepted from the hearsay rule. It
remains unclear to what extent the Maryland courts will be guided by
federal precedent on such difficult questions as the admissibility of
statements with self-serving or neutral aspects intermingled with their
241disserving aspects.
Rule 804(b) (4) provides an exception to the hearsay rule for
statements of personal or family history. The Rule is substantively
identical to its federal analog,24" but more liberal than prior Maryland
law. Unavailability is governed by Rule 5-804(a), while prior Maryland
law required the death of the declarant. The declarant need not be
related by blood, marriage or adoption if of sufficient intimacy with
the family as to "be likely to have accurate information."24' The state-
ment need not have been made before the controversy arose.
Finally, Rule 5-804(b) (5) repeats the residual exception in Rule
5-803(b) (24) in identical language; the discussion of that exception is
equally applicable here.2 46 Because the only difference between the
two exceptions is the requirement of unavailability of the declarant
under Rule 5-804 and the irrelevance of unavailability under Rule 5-
803, one might think that Rule 5-804(b) (5) is simply redundant. Any
statement that meets the requirements of Rule 5-804(b) (5) should
240. See, e.g., Connor v. State, 225 Md. 543, 550-54, 171 A.2d 699, 703-05, cert. denied, 368
U.S. 906 (1961).
241. FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(3).
242. See, e.g., Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co. v. Kuhl, 296 Md. 446, 463 A.2d 822 (1983).
243. See, e.g., Williamson v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 2431 (1994).
244. FED. R. EvID. 804(b) (4)..
245. But see Rhoades v. Bussinger, 188 Md. 638, 645, 53 A.2d 419, 423 (1947) (excluding
testimony of "old colored woman" because she was not a member of the family).
246. See supra text accompanying notes 225-230.
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also qualify under Rule 5-803(b) (24). The only analysis that would
give separate effect to Rule 5-804(b) (5) would require consideration
of whether the other 5-804(b) exceptions have different or lesser cir-
cumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness than the other twenty-three
exceptions of Rule 5-803(b). Each residual exception requires cir-
cumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness "equivalent" to the other
enumerated exceptions of that rule. If the 803(b) exceptions differ
from the 804(b) exceptions, each residual exception could be given
its own meaning. It will be interesting to see whether the courts will
adopt such a reading or will construe the two residual exceptions in-
terchangeably, citing one if the declarant is available and the other if
unavailable.
Rule 5-805 differs stylistically but not substantively from its federal
analog. It makes clear that for hearsay within hearsay to be admitted,
the proponent must establish an exception for each level of hearsay.
The Rule is consistent with prior Maryland law.2 47
Rule 5-806 governs the impeachment of the declarant of a hear-
say statement. It differs from its federal counterpart to the extent nec-
essary to accommodate the differences in Maryland's classification
scheme of hearsay exceptions. Generally, it permits impeachment as
if the declarant were a witness at the trial. For obvious reasons, im-
peachment by prior inconsistent statement does not require an exami-
nation of the declarant about the statement nor the provision of an
opportunity to explain it."4 The Rule may change Maryland law in
this respect,249 but is otherwise consistent with prior Maryland law.
X. CHAPTER 900-AUTHENTICATION AND IDENTIFICATION
The rules governing authentication and identification of evi-
dence are particular manifestations of the relevancy requirement of
Rule 5-402. For evidence to be admitted, the proponent must estab-
lish that it is what it purports to be;25° a condition of authenticity must
be satisfied in order to conclude that the evidence is relevant. As Rule
5-901 (a) makes clear, it is sufficient that there is evidence "to support
a finding that the matter in question is what its proponent claims."
This standard is the same as that for conditional relevance under Rule
5-104(b), as it should be.
247. Ali v. State, 314 Md. 295, 304-05, 550 A.2d 925, 929-30 (1988).
248. See MD. R 5-613.
249. See Matthews v. Dare, 20 Md. 248, 269 (1863).
250. MD. R. 5-901(a).
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Rule 5-901 (b) provides a list of illustrations, by no means exhaus-
tive, of authentication. Any relevant evidence sufficient to meet the
relatively minimal requirements of the Rule will do. Most of the illus-
trations are substantively similar to their federal counterparts and also
reflect prior Maryland law. A few, however, require comment.
Rule 5-901 (b) (1) establishes what is perhaps the most straightfor-
ward method to authenticate evidence: the testimony of a witness
with personal knowledge that the evidence is what its proponent
claims. 51
Rule 5-901 (b) (3), which provides for authentication by compari-
son with an authenticated exemplar, differs from the Federal Rule 252
and liberalizes prior Maryland practice. The Federal Rule permits the
jury or an expert witness to compare the proffered evidence with au-
thenticated exemplars. The Maryland Rule requires that the compari-
son be performed in the first instance by an expert witness or the
court. The jury may examine the proffered evidence only if the court
has first determined a sufficient similarity to support a finding of au-
thenticity. The Rule is more liberal than prior Maryland law, 55 which
required a court determination that the proffered evidence was au-
thentic, essentially under the standard of Rule 5-104(a).
Rule 5-901 (b) (7), like its federal analog, permits authentication
of a public record by evidence of official custody consistent with its
purported identity. It is important to note, however, that certain pub-
lic documents and certified copies of public records may be self-au-
thenticating, that is, they may not require authentication under Rule
5-901 .254
Rule 5-901 (b) (8) permits authentication of "ancient documents"
by evidence that the document was found in a place where it would be
expected to have been found and in a condition that created no suspi-
cion of inauthenticity. Like the analogous federal rule,255 it defines
"ancient" as twenty years, shortening the time required under prior
Maryland law. 25
251. See, e.g., Wilson v. State, 44 Md. App. 318, 334, 408 A.2d 1058, 1066 (1979).
252. FED. R. EVID. 901(b) (3).
253. MD. CODE ANN., CTS. &JUD. PROC. § 10-906 (1989).
254. See infra text accompanying notes 258-263.
255. FED. R. EvID. 901(b)(8).




Finally, Rule 5-901 (b) (10) affirms the illustrative nature of the 5-
901 (b) list by recognizing that any method of authentication provided
by statute is permissible. 257
Rule 5-902 dispenses with the requirement of authentication for
several types of evidence. The common feature of such evidence is
the improbability that the evidence is not what it purports to be. The
condition of fact on which the relevancy of the evidence depends is
satisfied without the need for extrinsic evidence of authenticity. The
Rule is largely consistent with prior Maryland law and with its federal
analog, with a few noteworthy exceptions.
Rule 5-902(a) begins with a clause that excepts from the dispensa-
tion for authentication statutory provisions that require authentica-
tion. As a result, Maryland statutes that require authentication-and
perhaps foreign statutes found applicable under relevant choice of
law rules-continue to control even if the evidence would have been
self-authenticating in the absence of the statute.258
Rule 5-902(a) (5) expands Federal Rule 902(5) somewhat. Under
both rules, official publications are self-authenticating, but the Mary-
land Rule broadens the definition of official publication to include
not only "publications purporting to be issued by a public authority"
but also "publications ... authorized by a public agency," even if un-
dertaken by a private sponsor.
Perhaps the greatest liberalization in dispensing with the need
for authentication is found in Rule 5-902(a) (11). Under that Rule,
which has no federal counterpart, regularly kept business records, cer-
tified by the custodian as meeting the requirements of the hearsay
exception for business records259 need no further authentication by a
testifying witness. Curiously, there is no corresponding dispensation
for a certification of the absence of a record excepted from the hear-
say rule by Rule 5-803(b) (7), which apparently still requires the testi-
mony of the custodian or another with authority that a diligent search
produced no result. Rule 5-902 (a) (11) requires that timely notice
and an opportunity to examine the records be provided to the oppo-
nent. The Rule extends prior Maryland law that dispensed with the
need to authenticate certified hospital records.2 °
Finally, Rule 5-902 (a) (12) provides that if pre-trial objection as to
authenticity is required and not timely made, the evidence does not
257. See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., CTS. &JuD. PROC. §§ 10-1001 to -1004.
258. See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., CrS. & JUD. PROC. § 10-306 (permitting admission of
breathalyzer results without presence or testimony of the technician).
259. MD. R. 5-803(b) (6).
260. See MD. R. 2-510(g); MD. R. 3-510(g).
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require additional authentication "[u]nless justice otherwise re-
quires." The Rule is less one of self-authentication than waiver of ob-
jections not timely made. 61
There is no federal counterpart to Rule 5-902(b), which defines
"certifies" and its nominative form.262 Several categories of evidence
declared self-authenticating in Rule 5-902(a) also require
certification. 65
Rule 5-903 establishes that documents that require a subscribing
witness may be authenticated without the testimony of the subscribing
witness, unless otherwise provided by statute. The Rule is consistent
with prior Maryland practice and is substantively consistent with its
federal counterpart, except that it contains no conflict of laws provi-
sion. The Maryland Code requires the testimony of a subscribing wit-
ness to authenticate a will or codicil. 26
XI. CHAPTER 1000-CONTENTS OF WRITINGS, RECORDINGS, AND
PHOTOGRAPHS
Chapter 1000 addresses proof of the contents of writings, record-
ings or photographs, well-known at common law as "the best evidence
rule" but better understood as an original documents rule. The Chap-
ter begins with a set of definitions of the critical terms found in the
rules it comprises,265 followed by a general rule requiring the original
writing, recording, or photograph to prove its contents.2 66 Following
the general requirement are a series of rules that provide for particu-
lar exceptions.2 67 The Chapter concludes with a rule that defines the
different functions of court and jury. 68
Rule 5-1001 (a) and (b) define writings and recordings, and pho-
tographs, respectively, in broad terms, including, for example, mag-
netic or electronic recordings, x-rays, and videotapes. The attempt is
to take account of new technological methods of recordation. The
definitions are consistent with pre-existing Maryland statutory law2 69
and with the analogous Federal Rule. Rule 5-1001 (c) and (d) define
261. Cf. FED. R. CIv. P. 26(a) (3) (C).
262. MD. R. 5-902(b).
263. See MD. R. 5-902 (a) (3) (Foreign Public Documents); MD. R. 5-902(a) (4) (Certified
Copies of Public Records); MD. R. 5-902 (a) (11) (Certified Records of Regularly Conducted
Business Activity).
264. MD. CODE ANN., CTS. &JUD. PROC. § 10-906 (1989).
265. MD. R 5-1001.
266. MD. R 5-1002.
267. MD. R. 5-1003 to -1007.
268. MD. R. 5-1008.
269. MD. CODE ANN., Cs. &JUD. PROC. § 10-103(a) (1989).
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"original" and "duplicate," respectively, and are also consistent with
pre-existing Maryland law27 and with the Federal Rules.
Rule 5-1002 declares that the original of a writing, recording, or
photograph is required to prove its content unless the Maryland Code
or Rules provide otherwise. The Rule is consistent with prior Mary-
land law27 1 and with its federal counterpart.
Rule 5-1003 provides the first exception to the Rule requiring an
original in an exception so broad as to change the Rule to permit
duplicates in most instances in which Rule 5-1002 would require the
original. The Rule provides for the admissibility of duplicates to the
same extent as the original unless there is a genuine question of the
original's authenticity, or if it would otherwise be unfair not to require
the original. The Rule is consistent with prior Maryland law, primarily
statutory,272 and identical to the Federal Rule.
Rule 5-1004 dispenses with the requirement of the original in
four circumstances: If the original has been lost or destroyed without
the bad faith connivance of the proponent, evidence of content other
than the original is permissible. 73 If the original cannot be obtained
"by any reasonably practicable, available judicial process," evidence of
content other than the original is permissible. 74 This represents
some liberalization of Federal Rule 1004(2), which does not contain
the phrase "reasonably practicable." If the opponent of the evidence
had control of the original, had notice that its contents would be the
subject of proof, and did not produce the original, other evidence of
content is permissible.2 7 ' Finally, the original is not required if the
contents are offered as evidence of some collateral matter. The Rule
is generally consistent with prior Maryland law2 76 except that notions
of degrees of secondary evidence no longer matter.2 77
Rule 5-1005 permits the content of public records to be shown by
certified copy pursuant to Rule 5-902 or by testimony that the copy is
accurate by one who has compared the copy to the original. The Rule
270. Id. § 10-103(a)(3) & (b)(4).
271. See, e.g., Trimble v. State, 300 Md. 387, 402, 478 A-2d 1143, 1151 (1984).
272. MD. CODE ANN., CTs. &JUD. PROC. § 10-103(b) (1989); cf. MD. CODE ANN., CTS. &
JUD. PROC. § 10-102 (Supp. 1994) (photocopies of business and public records); id. § 10-
206 (1989) (copies of worn out court records).
273. See Reed v. State, 35 Md. App. 472, 484-86, 372 A.2d 243, 252-53 (1977), rev'd on
other grounds, 283 Md. 374, 391 A.2d 364 (1978).
274. See Summons v. State, 156 Md. 391, 398, 144 A. 497, 504-05 (1929).
275. See Stumpf v. Stumpf, 228 Md. 350, 355-56, 179 A.2d 893, 896-97 (1962).
276. See LYNN McLAJN, 6 MARYLAND PRACnCE, MARLAND EVIDENCE 540 (1987).
277. See General Builders Supply Co. v. MacArthur, 228 Md. 320, 327, 179 A.2d 868, 872
(1962).
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revives the notion of degrees of secondary evidence to the extent that
other evidence of contents may be introduced only if the foregoing
evidence is not obtainable "by the exercise of reasonable diligence."
The Rule is substantively identical to its federal counterpart and is not
inconsistent with pre-existing Maryland statutes.27 1
If the relevant writings, recordings, or photographs are too volu-
minous and unwieldy for convenient presentation at trial, Rule 5-1006
permits the proponent to use charts or other summaries in lieu of the
originals. The opponent of the evidence must be given notice and an
opportunity to verify the accuracy of the summaries. The Rule is es-
sentially consistent with prior Maryland law 2 79 but exceeds the analo-
gous federal rule by its explicit pretrial notice requirement although
otherwise consistent with it.
Rule 5-1007 is essentially identical to its federal counterpart. The
Rule dispenses with the need for the original if the contents of a writ-
ing, recording, or photograph are proved by the testimony of the
party against whom the evidence is offered or by that party's written
admission, even in the absence of an explanation for the lack of the
original. The extension to a party's written admission extends prior
Maryland law, although the rule is otherwise consistent with it.28 0 It is
not entirely clear whether the testimony of the adverse party needs to
arise in the same proceeding.
Rule 5-1008 states the appropriate division of decision-making be-
tween judge and jury. It is a more detailed application to the "best
evidence rule" of the more general problem addressed in Rule 5-
104.28 Under Rule 5-1008(a), the court determines questions of ad-
missibility, including the existence of facts upon which admissibility
depends. 2 2 Under Rule 5-1008(b), however, the trier of fact deter-
mines whether the writing, recording, or photograph ever existed, if
its existence is disputed; whether a competing writing, recording, or
photograph is the original; and whether other evidence of the content
is accurate.283
278. See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., CTS. &JUD. PROC. § 10-204 (1989); MD. CODE ANN., NAT.
RES. § 6-108(c) (1989); MD. CODE ANN., TRANsp. § 12-113(b)(1) (Supp. 1994).
279. See, e.g., Chapman v. State, 331 Md. 448, 461, 628 A.2d 676, 683 (1993); Sergeant
Co. v. Clifton Bldg. Corp., 47 Md. App. 307, 313-17, 423 A.2d 257, 260-62 (1980), cert.
denied, 289 Md. 740 (1981).
280. See, e.g., Parr Constr. Co. v. Pomer, 217 Md. 539, 542, 144 A.2d 69, 71 (1958).
281. See supra text accompanying notes 42-43.
282. Cf MD. R. 5-104(a).
283. Cf MD. R. 5-104(b).
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XII. CONCLUSION
The new Maryland Rules of Evidence create a number of signifi-
cant changes in Maryland's law of evidence. Similarly, they differ in a
few significant ways from the Federal Rules of Evidence. The differ-
ences, however, are less matters of substance than clarifications of
what had been intended, though not as artfully expressed, in the Fed-
eral Rules. More important, the new Rules codify and systematize the
patchwork of statutes, rules and practices that formerly comprised the
law of evidence in Maryland. The current regime should facilitate
and simplify trial preparation as well as improve the application of
evidence law at trial and on appeal. It is a reform late in coming but
no less welcome for that.
